Gendering the Narrative of the Irish Crisis

Abstract

Adding a gender dimension to the story of the Irish crisis deepens our understanding of crisis and necessary responses. Using gender both as category and process we see clear gendered patterns throughout the Irish crisis including patterns of gender inequality in gendered institutions and changes in the process of gendered agency. Reviewing the extent to which Irish political and public spheres, banking and budgetary processes are gendered raises questions about how this impacts on post crisis outcomes. The gendered lens draws attention to the risks inherent in hyper-masculine institutions and culture and questions whether greater gender balance might alter the risk oriented culture of Irish financial services. It also draws attention to the gendered nature of Irish austerity budgets which disproportionately impacted women, and low income women in particular. The crisis also impacted on feminist agency. Examining women's political agency in the context of the crisis we find examples of defensive agency that sought to protect women's interests from fiscal retrenchment. These exist alongside examples of offensive feminist agency that use the crisis as an opportunity to strengthen gender equality in the political and policy processes. We find the gender infrastructure negatively impacted but despite such damage, we find feminist agency remains crucial to realising gender equality in public and private decision-making and despite the crisis, hopeful signs of renewed feminist agency are present.

Toward a gender politics of aging

“…The challenge cuts both ways -gerontology needs to consider politics of gender, but gender analysts also need to include older women as 'old age, as a political location, has been ignored' (Calasanti, Slevin and King, 2006: 14). For instance, research on the gender impact of the economic crisis (2008 onwards) refers to the need to make a concerted effort to agitate to include women's issues in order to avoid the rolling back of gains made during more prosperous and stable economic times (Murphy, 2015;Cullen, 2014). This literature does not mention older women, or the intersection of age and gender, reflecting the 'relative neglect of aging women in both gerontology and feminism' (Hooyman, 2002: 4).…”

Leading the debate for the business case for gender equality, perilous for whom?

“…In the Irish context austerity has had specific gendered consequences with a similar outcome in the decline of infrastructure and funding devoted to addressing gender inequality (Barry & Conroy, ). This involved a significant contraction in state funds for gender equality programmes and organizations including a deep cut in funds for the NWCI and its constituent members (Murphy, ). Access to policy contexts had also diminished, for example, under the conditions of the International Monetary Fund/European Central Bank (IMF/ECB) bailout Ireland had not been required to contribute annual reports within the EU OMC processes including the Country Specific Recommendations (CSRs) and Structural Funds.…”

A ‘Fair Chance’? The Catholic Irish Brigade in the British Service, 1793–1798

“…The ranking of the regiments and their colonels were: 1st Regiment: Jacques Charles de Fitzjames, Duc de Fitzjames 2nd Regiment: Comte Antoine Walsh de Serrant 3rd Regiment: Chevalier Henry Dillon 4th Regiment: Comte Daniel Charles O'Connell 5th Regiment: Comte Thomas Conway; Vicomte Charles Walsh de Serrant (after 1795) 6th Regiment: James Henry Conway (Comte de Conway after 1795). 57 The colonels all had previous experience in the Irish Brigade in the French service, and some had served in other armies; Comte Thomas Conway was a veteran of the French and American armies. He had fought at the battles of Germantown and Brandywine in 1777, criticized George Washington's abilities, and later become a governor of Mauritius.…”

“…72 However, by September the decision had been made to draft the men from the 1st, 4th and 6th regiments into the 2nd, 3rd and 5th regiments in order to bring these regiments up to strength. 73 This was a practical economic move, as it made more financial and administrative sense to have one or two full-strength regiments than several partfilled regiments. The officers of the drafted regiments were to be put on half pay.…”