Genealogies of Islamic Radicalism in Post-Suharto Indonesia

Abstract

The emergence of violent Muslim vigilante groups in regions of Indonesia where there has been serious inter-religious conflict is one of the most conspicuous new phenomena in contemporary Indonesian Islam. During the brief presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid, such groups often gained control of the streets, and the army and police appeared unable, or unwilling, to contain them. Most observers of modern Indonesia agree that much of the violence is financed by military and civilian interest groups, and is provoked by struggles for power between rival élite factions. But at the same time it is clear that at least some of these groups are rooted in movements that existed long before the present crisis. This paper argues that the roots of most of the radical Muslim groups in contemporary Indonesia can be traced to two relatively ‘indigenous’ Muslim political movements which date back to the 1940s – the Darul Islam movement and the Masyumi party – and to a number of more recent transnational Islamic networks. It traces the transformations of Masyumi and Darul Islam from the 1950s and 1960s, the emergence of ‘campus Islam’ in the 1980s, the empowerment of Islam in the final years of the Suharto regime, and the course of Islamic politics during Suharto's downfall and in the 1999 elections, before looking in detail at the recent involvement of radical Muslim groups in street politics.

Tropes of the crusades in Indonesian Muslim discourse

“…Many of those studying in Saudi Arabia have adopted Wahhabi understandings of Islam. The fact 26 On the rise of radical Islamism in Indonesia see: van Bruinessen (2002) and Hasan (2006). that the Saudi government provides financial support for those who found or teach at Islamist educational institutions when they return has enabled them to spread Wahabi teachings.…”

“…6 In the wake of the Iranian Revolution of 1979, religious zeal and the perceived threat of Revolutionary Iran led the Saudis to accelerate attempts to spread their own understanding of Islam throughout the Muslim world. 7 Natsir had close personal relationships with members of the Saudi elite and with the Saudi government sponsored World Muslim League, of which he was for a time vice-chairman ( van Bruinessen 2002). DDII became what Rahmat calls the "motor" for the trans-nationalization of Indonesian Islamism.…”

Wahabism: Padri Movement in Minangkabau to the Islamic Defender Organization in Indonesia

“…The birth of a radical Islamic group in Indonesia after the reform has also been polemical and hot national debates, between which the view that the act is considered too radical affected by Wahabi. Basically,there have been many studies done about radicalism and Islam, as a study conducted by (Van Bruinessen, 2002); (Rahmat, 2005); (Turmudi & Sihbudi, 2005); (Umam, 2006); (Zaki, 2008), which discusses public attitudes about the pros and cons of Islamic radical. Likewise as (Fanani, 2013); (Azra, 2013); and (Maarif, 2013) respectively in the same journal examines the phenomenon of radicalism among youth and sociological reflection on the phenomenon of radicalism of young Muslims in Indonesia after the new order era.…”

“…FPI declared on August 17, 1998 (24 Rabiutsani 1419 H) on yard of Pondok Pesantren Al-Um Kampung Utan Ciputat, South Jakarta by a number Habib, Ulama, preachers, and Muslim activists who witnessed the hundreds of students who come from Jabodetabek (Van Bruinessen, 2002); (Saleh, 2013); (Rubaidi, 2014). The establishment of this organization just four months after President Soeharto resigned, because at the time president of the New Order government will not tolerate extremism in any form.…”

IN SEARCH OF SOCIO-HISTORICAL ROOTS OF SOUTHEAST ASIA’S ISLAMIST TERRORISM: With Special Reference to an Indonesian Experience

“…Giving the emphasis on the local politics and history of Indonesia as the nature of recent Muslim political movement, van Bruinessen argues that transnational networks, along which people, ideas, and money move, have become extremely important but "they are not the sole determining factor". 63 The dynamics of local politics in the Philippines also serve as the backbone for the rise of Muslim separatist movements. Islamist and separatist movements waged by Filipino Moros had been driven by coercion and discriminatory acts against them committed by the dictator Ferdinand Marcos when he had been in power since 1965.…”