Generalized Second Price Auction in Multi-Path Routing with Selfish Nodes

Su, Xueyuan; Chan, Sammy; Peng, Gang

doi:10.1109/glocom.2009.5426057

Cited by 10 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…• Either there are no rational nodes, or rational nodes have been stimulated for cooperation by auction mechanisms such as [1], [21], [24] during the routing stage.…”

Section: B the Packet Delivery Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We can regard its utility function as unknown. In the literature, there are two main approaches to deal with misbehaving nodes: incentives to cooperation [1], [4], [5], [20], [21], [24], [25] or punishment to non-cooperation [2], [14], [15], [17], [22]. These approaches essentially treat selfish and malicious behaviors non-discriminatingly, but either one of them is not adequate to deal with both types of misbehaving nodes.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In [20], [21], we considered the problem of multi-path routing with selfish nodes. We proposed the generalized second price (GSP) auction to deal with rational behaviors, leading to Nash equilibria in which selfish nodes honestly participate in the routing process.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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FORBID: Cope with Byzantine Behaviors in Wireless Multi-Path Routing and Forwarding

Peng

Chan

2011

2011 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference - GLOBECOM 2011

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Consider multi-path routing and forwarding scenarios in wireless ad hoc networks. Rational and Byzantine nodes both might deviate from the protocol. However, their intentions and behaviors are different. To extend our previous work on generalized second price (GSP) auction for stimulating rational nodes for cooperation, we propose FORBID mechanism in this work to cope with Byzantine behaviors. The core of the FORBID mechanism is a decentralized reputation system. Based on available evidence, each node relies on Bayesian inference to internally update its reputation beliefs that how reliable each other node is. Different from the passive overhearing techniques such as "watchdog", each source node under FORBID actively triggers detection process to collect evidence towards Byzantine behaviors. In addition, FORBID includes a flocking algorithm to allow careful dissemination of reputation information and thus shortens the misbehavior detection time.Index Terms-Wireless ad hoc networks, multi-path routing and forwarding, Bayesian inference, flocking algorithm.978-1-4244-9268-8/11/$26.00 ©2011 IEEE This full text paper was peer reviewed at the direction of IEEE Communications Society subject matter experts for publication in the IEEE Globecom 2011 proceedings.

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“…• Either there are no rational nodes, or rational nodes have been stimulated for cooperation by auction mechanisms such as [1], [21], [24] during the routing stage.…”

Section: B the Packet Delivery Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

FORBID: Cope with Byzantine Behaviors in Wireless Multi-Path Routing and Forwarding

Peng

Chan

2011

2011 IEEE Global Telecommunications Conference - GLOBECOM 2011

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“…They mainly considered the single-path scenario. In [8,9], we assumed that all links and nodes are reliable, and have no hidden action. The generalised second price (GSP) auction in multi-path routing was proposed to deal with hidden information of selfish nodes.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We assume that the link failures are independent among different links, and aim to design protocols that can eliminate the hidden action without using additional monitoring scheme. As discussed in [8,9], although GSP achieves lower over-payment than VCG, its existing form used in Internet advertising does not guarantee each node to reveal its true cost. Therefore, we also need to design a mechanism which results in Nash equilibria for all nodes to behave honestly.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Reliable Multi-path Routing in Selfish Networks with Hidden Information and Actions

Peng¹,

Zou²,

Chan

2012

JSEA

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In this paper, we propose a novel game-theoretical solution to the multi-path routing problem in wireless ad hoc networks comprising selfish nodes with hidden information and actions. By incorporating a suitable traffic allocation policy, the proposed mechanism results in Nash equilibria where each node honestly reveals its true cost, and forwarding subgame perfect equilibrium in which each node does provide forwarding service with its declared service reliability. Based on the generalised second price auction, this mechanism effectively alleviates the over-payment of the well-known VCG mechanism. The effectiveness of this mechanism will be shown through simulations

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A Novel Approach to Avoid Selfish Nodes During Allocation of Data Items in MANETs

Samal

Mishra

Pati

et al. 2018

Advances in Intelligent Systems and Computing

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Generalized Second Price Auction in Multi-Path Routing with Selfish Nodes

Cited by 10 publications

References 22 publications

FORBID: Cope with Byzantine Behaviors in Wireless Multi-Path Routing and Forwarding

FORBID: Cope with Byzantine Behaviors in Wireless Multi-Path Routing and Forwarding

Reliable Multi-path Routing in Selfish Networks with Hidden Information and Actions

A Novel Approach to Avoid Selfish Nodes During Allocation of Data Items in MANETs

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