Generating formal cryptographic protocol specifications

Carlsen, Ulf

doi:10.1109/risp.1994.296586

Cited by 25 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Using DES as cryptographic algorithm a shared secret key is used for authentication of messages ( [BGJY98]). A possible protocol written in a commonly used standard notation for cryptographic protocols ( [Car94])is: 1. to → from : {REQ,pdAuth(to)} K S 2. from → to : {VAL,pdAuth(from)} K S 3. to → from : {ACK,pdAuth(to)} K S In this protocol K S : key denotes a secret key shared between all valid Mondex cards. REQ, VAL and ACK are pairwise distinct constants used to distinguish the three message types.…”

Section: A Security Model For Mondex Pursesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Mondex Challenge: Machine Checked Proofs for an Electronic Purse

Schellhorn

Grandy

Haneberg

et al. 2006

FM 2006: Formal Methods

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Abstract. The Mondex case study about the specification and refinement of an electronic purse as defined in [SCJ00] has recently been proposed as a challenge for formal system-supported verification. This paper reports on the successful verification of the major part of the case study using the KIV specification and verification system. We demonstrate that even though the hand-made proofs were elaborated to an enormous level of detail we still could find small errors in the underlying data refinement theory as well as the formal proofs of the case study. We also provide an alternative formalisation of the communication protocol using abstract state machines. Finally the Mondex case study verifies functional correctness assuming a suitable security protocol. Therefore we propose to extend the case study to include the verification of a suitable security protocol.

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Section: A Security Model For Mondex Pursesmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Mondex Challenge: Machine Checked Proofs for an Electronic Purse

Schellhorn

Grandy

Haneberg

et al. 2006

FM 2006: Formal Methods

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“…We built Java implementations of these protocols automatically generating them with the AnBx compiler [11,12]. On both the original and revised versions we used the same cryptographic primitives and settings 7 . The results of the original and revised versions are usually similar, though the original 3KP and signed SET run slightly faster.…”

Section: Experimental Setup and Performancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In such frameworks, the semantics of the specification languages is defined by a translation into lower level formats, amenable to model-checking and automated verification. Besides making verification possible, the translation semantics provides for a clean separation between the abstract specification of the protocol structure and the details of its implementation, which may be generated directly from the specification [6,7,8,9,10,11,12]. This propose the definition and implementation of different channel abstractions, based on cryptographic realizations and interaction patterns.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Security protocol specification and verification with AnBx

Bugliesi

Calzavara

Mödersheim

et al. 2016

Journal of Information Security and Applications

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Designing distributed protocols is complex and requires actions at very different levels: from the design of an interaction flow supporting the desired application-specific guarantees, to the selection of the most appropriate network-level protection mechanisms. To tame this complexity, we propose AnBx , a formal protocol specification language based on the popular Alice & Bob notation. AnBx offers channels as the main abstraction for communication, providing different authenticity and/or confidentiality guarantees for message transmission. AnBx extends existing proposals in the literature with a novel notion of forwarding channels, enforcing specific security guarantees from the message originator to the final recipient along a number of intermediate forwarding agents. We give a formal semantics of AnBx in terms of a state transition system expressed in the AVISPA Intermediate Format. We devise an ideal channel model and a possible cryptographic implementation, and we show that, under mild restrictions, the two representations coincide, thus making AnBx amenable to automated verification with different tools. We demonstrate the benefits of the declarative specification style distinctive of AnBx by revisiting the design of two existing e-payment protocols, iKP and SET.

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“…Our protocol for the Mondex value transfer, written in a commonly used standard notation for cryptographic protocols [Car94], is:…”

Section: A Protocol With Symmetric Encryptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Verification of Mondex electronic purses with KIV: from transactions to a security protocol

et al. 2008

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Abstract. The Mondex case study about the specification and refinement of an electronic purse as defined in [SCW00] has recently been proposed as a challenge for formal system-supported verification. In this paper we report on two results.First, on the successful verification of the full case study using the KIV specification and verification system. We demonstrate that even though the hand-made proofs were elaborated to an enormous level of detail we still could find small errors in the underlying data refinement theory as well as the formal proofs of the case study.Second, the original Mondex case study verifies functional correctness assuming a suitable security protocol. We extend the case study here with a refinement to a suitable security protocol that uses symmetric cryptography to achieve the necessary properties of the security-relevant messages. The definition is based on a generic framework for defining such protocols based on abstract state machines (ASMs). We prove the refinement using a forward simulation.

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Generating formal cryptographic protocol specifications

Cited by 25 publications

References 29 publications

The Mondex Challenge: Machine Checked Proofs for an Electronic Purse

The Mondex Challenge: Machine Checked Proofs for an Electronic Purse

Security protocol specification and verification with AnBx

Verification of Mondex electronic purses with KIV: from transactions to a security protocol

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