Generic Threats to Routing Protocols

Abstract

This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.

BGP Prefix Origin Validation State Extended Community

“…Because this document introduces an extended community that will generally be used to affect route selection, the analysis in Section 4.5 ("Falsification") of [RFC4593] is relevant. These issues are neither new nor unique to the origin validation extended community.…”

A Security Threat Analysis for the Routing Protocol for Low-Power and Lossy Networks (RPLs)

“…This section sets the stage for the development of the analysis by applying the systematic approach proposed in [Myagmar2005] to the routing security, while also drawing references from other reviews and assessments found in the literature, particularly [RFC4593] and [Karlof2003] (i.e., selective forwarding, wormhole, and sinkhole attacks). The subsequent subsections begin with a focus on the elements of a generic routing process that is used to establish routing assets and points of access to the routing functionality.…”

“…The assessment in Section 4.2 indicates that there are attacks against the confidentiality of routing information at all points of access. This threat may result in disclosure, as described in Section 3.1.2 of [RFC4593], and may involve a disclosure of routing information.…”

“…o Byzantine (internal) attacks that permit corruption of routing information in the node even when the node continues to be a validated entity within the network (see, for example, [RFC4593] for further discussions on Byzantine attacks); and o physical device compromise or remote device access attacks.…”

Problem Statement and Requirements for IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Network (6LoWPAN) Routing

“…Security Considerations Security issues are described in Section 5.4. The security considerations in RFC 4919 [RFC4919], RFC 4944 [RFC4944], and RFC 4593 [RFC4593] apply as well.…”