Genome of Alaskapox Virus, a Novel Orthopoxvirus Isolated from Alaska

Gigante, Crystal M.; Gao, Jinxin; Tang, Shiyuyun; McCollum, Andrea M.; Wilkins, Kimberly; Reynolds, Mary G.; Davidson, Whitni; McLaughlin, Joseph; Olson, Victoria A.; Yu, Li

doi:10.3390/v11080708

Cited by 54 publications

(46 citation statements)

References 59 publications

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“…Funding for monkeypox research must be increased, and newly emerged orthopox viruses that cause disease in humans such as Akhmeta virus, identified in the Georgia Caucusus [60] or Alaskapox virus discovered in 2015 [61], add urgency to this need.…”

Section: The Futurementioning

confidence: 99%

Human Monkeypox – After 40 Years, an Unintended Consequence of Smallpox Eradication

et al. 2020

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Smallpox eradication, coordinated by the WHO and certified 40 years ago, led to the cessation of routine smallpox vaccination in most countries. It is estimated that over 70% of the world's population is no longer protected against smallpox, and through cross-immunity, to closely related orthopox viruses such as monkeypox. Monkeypox is now a re-emerging disease.Monkeypox is endemic in as yet unconfirmed animal reservoirs in sub-Saharan Africa, while its human epidemiology appears to be changing. Monkeypox in small animals imported from Ghana as exotic pets was at the origin of an outbreak of human monkeypox in the USA in 2003. Travellers infected in Nigeria were at the origin of monkeypox cases in the UK in 2018 and 2019, Israel in 2018 and Singapore in2019. Together with sporadic reports of human infections with other orthopox viruses, these facts invite speculation that emergent or re-emergent human monkeypox might fill the epidemiological niche vacated by smallpox.An ad-hoc and unofficial group of interested experts met to consider these issues at Chatham House, London in June 2019, in order to review available data and identify monkeypox-related research gaps.

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Section: The Futurementioning

confidence: 99%

Human Monkeypox – After 40 Years, an Unintended Consequence of Smallpox Eradication

et al. 2020

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“…These trends are already reflected in range expansion of existing pathogens (278,279), and could promote reemergence of past diseases, novel hostpathogen relationships, and the emergence of new zoonotic diseases including vector-borne diseases (121,185,277,(280)(281)(282). Novel pathogens have recently emerged in northern regions: A second case of Alaskapox virus was reported in Fairbanks in October, 2020, with suspected, but as yet unknown, zoonotic origin (283), and Erysipelothrix has emerged as an apparently new disease causing agent in muskoxen in Canada, with a genotype distinct from strains found in other regions (121).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Implications of Zoonoses From Hunting and Use of Wildlife in North American Arctic and Boreal Biomes: Pandemic Potential, Monitoring, and Mitigation

Keatts

Robards

Olson

et al. 2021

Front. Public Health

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The COVID-19 pandemic has re-focused attention on mechanisms that lead to zoonotic disease spillover and spread. Commercial wildlife trade, and associated markets, are recognized mechanisms for zoonotic disease emergence, resulting in a growing global conversation around reducing human disease risks from spillover associated with hunting, trade, and consumption of wild animals. These discussions are especially relevant to people who rely on harvesting wildlife to meet nutritional, and cultural needs, including those in Arctic and boreal regions. Global policies around wildlife use and trade can impact food sovereignty and security, especially of Indigenous Peoples. We reviewed known zoonotic pathogens and current risks of transmission from wildlife (including fish) to humans in North American Arctic and boreal biomes, and evaluated the epidemic and pandemic potential of these zoonoses. We discuss future concerns, and consider monitoring and mitigation measures in these changing socio-ecological systems. While multiple zoonotic pathogens circulate in these systems, risks to humans are mostly limited to individual illness or local community outbreaks. These regions are relatively remote, subject to very cold temperatures, have relatively low wildlife, domestic animal, and pathogen diversity, and in many cases low density, including of humans. Hence, favorable conditions for emergence of novel diseases or major amplification of a spillover event are currently not present. The greatest risk to northern communities from pathogens of pandemic potential is via introduction with humans visiting from other areas. However, Arctic and boreal ecosystems are undergoing rapid changes through climate warming, habitat encroachment, and development; all of which can change host and pathogen relationships, thereby affecting the probability of the emergence of new (and re-emergence of old) zoonoses. Indigenous leadership and engagement in disease monitoring, prevention and response, is vital from the outset, and would increase the success of such efforts, as well as ensure the protection of Indigenous rights as outlined in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Partnering with northern communities and including Indigenous Knowledge Systems would improve the timeliness, and likelihood, of detecting emerging zoonotic risks, and contextualize risk assessments to the unique human-wildlife relationships present in northern biomes.

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“…Beside these known challenges, novel zoonotic poxviruses are being discovered regularly, many of them with zoonotic characteristics like the Alaskapox virus [62] and the Akhmeta virus [63]. It is fair to expect that more examples may follow and any novel poxvirus should be critically assessed for its zoonotic ability and potential to adapt to humans as a host.…”

Section: Orthopoxviruses As Biothreat Agents and Biorisksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Smallpox in the Post-Eradication Era

Meyer

Ehmann

Smith

2020

Viruses

134

103

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Widespread vaccination programmes led to the global eradication of smallpox, which was certified by the World Health Organisation (WHO), and, since 1978, there has been no case of smallpox anywhere in the world. However, the viable variola virus (VARV), the causative agent of smallpox, is still kept in two maximum security laboratories in Russia and the USA. Despite the eradication of the disease smallpox, clandestine stocks of VARV may exist. In a rapidly changing world, the impact of an intentional VARV release in the human population would nowadays result in a public health emergency of global concern: vaccination programmes were abolished, the percentage of immunosuppressed individuals in the human population is higher, and an increased intercontinental air travel allows for the rapid viral spread of diseases around the world. The WHO has authorised the temporary retention of VARV to enable essential research for public health benefit to take place. This work aims to develop diagnostic tests, antiviral drugs, and safer vaccines. Advances in synthetic biology have made it possible to produce infectious poxvirus particles from chemicals in vitro so that it is now possible to reconstruct VARV. The status of smallpox in the post-eradication era is reviewed.

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Genome of Alaskapox Virus, a Novel Orthopoxvirus Isolated from Alaska

Cited by 54 publications

References 59 publications

Human Monkeypox – After 40 Years, an Unintended Consequence of Smallpox Eradication

Human Monkeypox – After 40 Years, an Unintended Consequence of Smallpox Eradication

Implications of Zoonoses From Hunting and Use of Wildlife in North American Arctic and Boreal Biomes: Pandemic Potential, Monitoring, and Mitigation

Smallpox in the Post-Eradication Era

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