Germany's (lack of) success in implementing the American strategy of extended detterence against Russia

Abstract

Examining the relationship between Germany and the U.S. through Lake's theory of international hierarchies reveals that, in the area of security, this relationship is at the very end of the hierarchy, with Germany in a subordinate position. The foundation of this relationship is a "trade-off": security for sovereignty, meaning that Germany entrusts its security to the U.S., but in return, it is obligated to align its security policy with American policy, thereby losing part of its sovereignty. With the onset of the Russo-Ukrainian war in 2022, the U.S. opted for a strategy of extended deterrence against Russia, and Germany, as dictated by this hierarchical relationship, aligned its defence policy with the U.S. and accepted its role in the American strategy of extended deterrence. Although Germany has played a significant role in U.S. extended deterrence against Russia since the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian war, the question arises whether this strategy is successful in the case of Germany. For a strategy to be considered successful, it must be both efficient and effective. The main hypothesis is that as time passes and the war progresses, Germany's implementation of the strategy of extended deterrence reveals itself to be both ineffective and inefficient. To answer the central research question, the paper is divided into three chapters. The first analyses the relationship between Germany and the U.S. through Lake's theory of international hierarchies, emphasizing what this relationship means for Germany. This relationship is at the very end of the hierarchy, effectively constituting a protectorate. Consequently, this relationship obliges Germany to implement the strategy of extended deterrence against Russia as part of the broader competition between the U.S. and Russia. The second part of the paper discusses why Germany believed in the effectiveness of the strategy of extended deterrence against Russia at the beginning of the Russo-Ukrainian war and how the U.S. contributed to this belief. A prerequisite for successful deterrence, and thus extended deterrence, is possessing adequate power so that the threat of its use is effective. Due to the pronounced asymmetry in military capabilities between Germany and Russia, an autonomous German implementation of the strategy of extended deterrence would not be possible because the threat would not be effective. Additionally, any state conducting a strategy of extended deterrence must include in its assessment the risk associated with an insufficient capability to deter a potential aggressor. Germany's military "sterility" makes the risk of implementing a strategy of extended deterrence unacceptable. However, the mentioned hierarchical relationship with the U.S., which is a nuclear power and the most militarily powerful country in the world, with a significant number of troops and armaments on German territory, enables Germany to implement this strategy. Thus, three days after the war began, German Chancellor Scholz implicitly indicated Germany's willingness to be part of the U.S. extended deterrence against Russia in his speech. Since then, activities have been conducted, conditionally speaking, at three levels: that of Germany, Europe, and the U.S. on German soil. Finally, the third chapter focuses on analyzing the effectiveness and efficiency of Germany's implementation of the strategy of extended deterrence. More than two years since the start of the war, a cost-benefit analysis indicates a negative relationship between investment and outcomes, meaning that for Germany, this strategy is ineffective. Germany's economy, no matter how strong, cannot quickly compensate for decades of underinvestment in the military and transform militarily "sterile" Germany into a military power. On the other hand, regarding effectiveness, the primary goal of implementing this strategy is stated as peace in Europe, and thus in Ukraine. However, the activities Germany undertakes lead to an arms race with Russia, and the stationing of German troops in Lithuania, along with the increase of military capacities in Kaliningrad, creates a security dilemma, which brings Germany a step closer to war rather than peace. This indicates that Germany's implementation of the strategy of extended deterrence is also ineffective. The inefficacy and ineffectiveness confirm Germany's failure to implement the American strategy of extended deterrence.