I shall discuss three issues in my commentary on the excellent paper by Halberstadt, Denham, and Dunsmore. These issues are, briefly, the inseparability of cognitive representation in both emotional and social functioning, the role played by context, and the significance of goals in any construct involving competence. However, before I begin that discussion, I want to point out the strengths of the authors' contribution to the literature on social-emotional development.Foremost, in my opinion, is the wealth of fascinating research ideas that they have generated in their review. I anticipate that we will see the outcomes of these suggested studies in the several years to come. In many ways, these research suggestions also spell out a wonderfully rich platform from which we might examine our educational efforts to improve research training, for example, strengthening students' skills at observational research methodology and their ability to conceptualize non-laboratory naturalistic investigations. Secondly, the authors have done us all a genuine service in summarizing and comparing several theoretical perspectives on social-emotional competence, namely Crick and Dodge's social information-processing approach (1994); Saarni's emotional competence model (1999), and Mayer and Salovey's emotional intelligence construct (1997). Thirdly, the research review itself is a rich source of information and has been thoughtfully prepared (although I would have liked to see more of the work of some very significant European contributors to that body of research represented in this review). Lastly, the measurement issues discussed relative to each of the proposed affective social competence components will assuredly provide valuable guidance for future investigations into social and emotional development.
Representation and Emotion MeaningCognition and representational skills are inextricable from how emotion is interpreted (or 'received' using Halberstadt, et al.'s language). Folk theories of emotion reflect ordinary daily life representations of emotional exchanges, and thus much of what folk theories of emotion do for us is tell us how to interpret the emotionally communicative behavior of others (Lutz, 1983;Saarni, 1998Saarni, , 1999White, 2000;Wierzbicka, 1994). Conceivably, those children who also efficaciously communicate their own affective experience are those children who have learned their subculture's