AcknowledgementsData analyses in this paper are based on micro-data from the Office of National Statistics' (ONS) Longitudinal Study (LS), linking England and Wales Census data for a (roughly) 1% sample of the population, accessed securely via the Virtual Microdata Laboratory in ONS. Census output is Crown copyright and is reproduced with the permission of the Controller of HMSO and the Queen's Printer for Scotland. The permission of the ONS to use the LS for this study is gratefully acknowledged, as is the substantial help provided by staff of the Centre for Longitudinal Study Information & User Support (CeLSIUS). CeLSIUS is supported by the ESRC Census of Population Programme . This presentation has been cleared by ONS (Clearance Number 30112) but the authors alone are responsible for the interpretation of the data. Analysis has been supported by ESRC/BIS/WAG grants to the Spatial Economic Research Centre, but these sponsors also bear no responsibility for findings reported here.
AbstractIn the urban resurgence accompanying the growth of the knowledge economy, second-order cities appear to be losing out to the principal city, especially where the latter is much larger and benefits from substantially greater agglomeration economies. The view that any city can make itself attractive to creative talent seems at odds with the idea of a country having just one 'escalator region' where the rate of career progression is much faster, especially for inmigrants. This paper takes the case of England, with its highly primate city-size distribution, and tests how its second-order cities (in size order, Birmingham, Manchester, Leeds, Newcastle, Bristol, Sheffield, Liverpool, Nottingham and Leicester) compare with London as human-capital escalators. The analysis is based on the ONS Longitudinal Study of linked census records, primarily for 1991-2001, and uses one key indicator of upward social mobility, the transition from White Collar Non-core to White Collar Core. For non-migrants, the transition rates for all the second-order cities are found to fall well short of London's. In only one case -Manchester -is the rate significantly higher than the average for other areas outside the Greater South East (GSE) and its performance is matched by the non-London part of the GSE. Those moving to the second-order cities during the decade experienced much stronger upward social mobility than their non-migrants. This 'migrant premium' was generally similar to that for London, suggesting that it results from people moving only after they have secured a better job. If so, second-order cities cannot rely on the speculative migration of talented people but need suitable jobs ready for them to access.