Ghana’s Experiments with Business–Government Coordination

Abstract

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Overview and Insights

“…Indeed, according to macroeconomic indicators, domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) increased during the period from 1960 (see Aryeetey and Owoo, 2015: figure 1). Additionally, legislations such as the Industrial Relations Act of 1958 (to harmonize relations between employers and employees); the Companies Code of 1960 (to regulate profit and non-profit companies); and the Capital Investment Act of 1963 (to provide guidance on the allocations of concessions to investors) were introduced to further regulate the conditions of businesses in the country.…”

The Practice of Industrial Policy

“…1 Identifying the importance of credit to the development of private businesses, the state also established institutions, such as the Industrial Development Organization, to provide access to credit to businessmen. Indeed, according to macroeconomic indicators, domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP) increased during the period from 1960 (see Aryeetey and Owoo, 2015: figure 1).…”

“…Additionally, the government refused to settle external debts that it considered to be dubious . Net foreign direct investment (FDI) (per cent of GDP) into the country therefore declined to an all-time low of -0.66 per cent by 1976 (see Aryeetey and Owoo 2015: figure 3), and growth in the manufacturing sector fell. Furthermore, despite its initial impressive trend, economic growth rates plummeted from 6.85 per cent in 1974 to an all-time low of -12.43 per cent in 1975, to -2.5 per cent by the end of the NRC regime.…”

Breaking the path in national development? The politics of public–private partnerships in Ghana

“…The ministry was expected to champion the golden age of business by creating a hospitable environment for private businesses. The government further prioritized macroeconomic stability, privatization, and liberalization of critical sectors of the economy (Ackah et al, 2010; Ayettey and Owoo, 2015). It argued that a “liberalized trade, investment, and industrial policy will attract manufacturers, entrepreneurs, and traders and encourage them to establish value-added job-creation facilities in Ghana” (Arthur, 2006: 8).…”

“…As part of its pro-business idea it expanded the mandate of the Ministry of Trade, and established the President’s Special Initiatives (PSIs) as a way of attracting private businesses, especially to the agro-processing and garment sectors (Ackah et al, 2010; Asem et al, 2013). The PSIs centered on five pillars, including the mobilization of private initiative, expansion of the industrial and export base, and a fruitful partnership between government and the private sector (Ayettey and Owoo, 2015: 11). It also enhanced the Free Zones Board concept initiated by the NDC, as well as established an Export Development and Investment Fund (EDIF) in 2001.…”