GITM: A GINI Index-Based Trust Mechanism to Mitigate and Isolate Sybil Attack in RPL-Enabled Smart Grid Advanced Metering Infrastructures

Abstract

The smart grid relies on Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) to function. Because of the significant packet loss and slow transmission rate of the wireless connection between smart meters in AMI, these infrastructures are considered Low-power and Lossy Networks (LLNs). The routing protocol in an AMI network is crucial for ensuring the availability and timeliness of data transfer. IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low-power and lossy networks (RPL) is an excellent routing option for the AMI communication configuration. However, it is highly at risk against many external and internal attacks, and its effectiveness may be severely diminished by Sybil assault. Different trust-based techniques have been suggested to mitigate internal attacks. However, existing trust systems have high energy consumption issues, which cause a reduction in the performance of LLNs due to complex calculations at the node level. Therefore, this paper presents a novel fog-enabled GINI index-based trust mechanism (GITM) to mitigate Sybil attacks using the forwarding behavior of legitimate member nodes. Regarding identifying and isolating Sybil assaults, our approach outperforms the state-of-the-art methods. GITM detects and isolates a more significant number of malicious network nodes compared to other techniques within a similar time frame. By using the proposed GITM framework, the Sybil attack detection rate increases by 4.48%, energy consumption reduces by 21%, and isolation latency reduces by 26.30% (concerning time). Furthermore, the end-to-end delay is merely 0.30% more in our case, and the number of control messages decreases by 28%.INDEX TERMS Smart grid, GINI index, advanced metering infrastructure, LLN, RPL, Sybil attack, trust.

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Securing Smart Healthcare Cyber-Physical Systems against Blackhole and Greyhole Attacks Using a Blockchain-Enabled Gini Index Framework

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