Give Me Your Least Educated: Immigration, Education and Support for Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe

Cordero, Guillermo; Zagórski, Piotr; Rama, José

doi:10.1177/14789299211029110

Cited by 8 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 25 publications

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“…To be sure, this does not mean that they are less likely to be influenced by populism and populist rhetoric. Indeed, Bos and colleagues (2013) show that less educated and more cynical citizens are more prone to be persuaded by populist politicians’ rhetoric, and strong evidence exists that lower education is associated with greater support for populist parties (Cordero et al., 2022; Schmuck & Matthes, 2015). In line with this literature, indeed, we have shown that more educated respondents seem better able to distinguish populist from non‐populist rhetoric.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Populism in the eye of the beholder? A conjoint experiment on citizens’ identification of populists

Casiraghi

Curini

Nai

2023

European J Political Res

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Despite decades of research on the nature and characteristics of populism, and on how political actors interpret populist attitudes, the study of how the public identify populist politicians remains a largely unexplored topic. Is populism in the eye of the beholder? What causes voters to perceive a political actor as populist? Is there any systematic heterogeneity in the evaluation of candidates among citizens according to their individual characteristics? We fill this gap by analysing what characteristics of politicians, and the political statements they make, drive citizens to classify them as populist. Furthermore, we investigate how the cognitive, ideological and attitudinal profiles of citizens shape their perceptions. To this end, we report results of a conjoint experiment embedded in a survey administered to a nationally representative sample of Italian citizens. Respondents were asked to evaluate different political statements by politicians, of whom we manipulated a variety of relevant attributes (e.g., their ideological profile, gender, previous occupation). Results indicate two clear trends: (i) More than the profile of politicians, what matters for their identification as populist is their rhetoric. (ii) The cognitive (with the partial exception of education) and ideological profiles of respondents are largely inconsequential. At the same time, populist voters are substantively less likely to identify populism as such.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Populism in the eye of the beholder? A conjoint experiment on citizens’ identification of populists

Casiraghi

Curini

Nai

2023

European J Political Res

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“…Studying Spain, Mendez and Cutillas (2014) prove that Latin American immigration increased natives' participation rate and their support for the major leftist party and explain their findings mainly through non-economic factors like language, religion and race. Focusing on 11 European countries, Cordero et al (2021) show that immigration drives up support for right-wing populist parties among low-educated voters, while in regions with higher share of educated immigrants, more educated voters are likely to turn to populist parties. Relatively fewer studies find support for the contact hypothesis.…”

Section: Time Period T -1: Economic Hardship and Changes In Vote Sharementioning

confidence: 98%

An Economic Understanding of Populism: A Conceptual Framework of the Demand and the Supply Side of Populism

Benczés

Szabó

2022

Political Studies Review

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This article assesses progress in the economics-centred literature on populism along three key themes and develops a conceptual framework to better understand the phenomenon. On the demand side (t − 1), economics research identifies the effect of an exogenous economic shock on a marginalised segment of society and works with the economic voting hypothesis. On the supply side of populists in power (t), in the literature, populist rule is typically associated with unsustainable expansionary fiscal and monetary policies and with trade protectionism. At t + 1, by using rational and biased belief assumptions, economists provide implicit inputs for a seemingly paradoxical question: why is a populist re-elected even if most populist policies assumably end up in Pareto inferior outcomes? This article summarises and criticises the relevant economic literature and shows that not only political science, but economics scholarship is instrumental for studying populism at all three stages.

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“…Economic explanations propose that opposition to immigration is fuelled by economic anxieties due to increased labour market competition, reducing job opportunities for natives and by immigration being perceived as a strain on the social welfare system. Cultural explanations relate to cultural grievances in different forms, such as perceptions of immigrants bringing crime and social unrest, undermining national culture and threatening liberal values (Cordero et al, 2023; Elgenius & Rydgren, 2019; Golder, 2016; Lonsky, 2021; Mjelde, 2020). However, they need not to be competing explanations as both may matter but in different ways (Halikiopoulou & Vlandas, 2020), interact to affect social status and feelings of social marginalization (Gidron & Hall, 2020) or be context‐dependent, whereby certain social groups develop anxieties only under certain circumstances (Cordero et al, 2023).…”

Section: Theoretical Framework and Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can a change in the leadership of a populist radical right party be traced among voters? The case of the Finns Party

Söderlund,

Grönlund

2024

Scand Pol Stud

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What happens to the electorate of a populist radical right party when the party splits? Finland provides an excellent case for an analysis of this nature. In 2017, the Finns Party split due to an internal rift. Party leadership was taken over by members of the party's anti‐immigrant faction, who, in the election of 2019, succeeded in replicating the party's previous electoral successes in 2011 and 2015. At the same time, the moderate faction that split from the party was wiped out in the election. In the election of 2023, the party gained yet another victory. Using the Finnish National Election Studies (2011, 2015, 2019 and 2023), we examine whether the party's transformation to a more anti‐immigrant populist radical right party is reflected in the policy positions and sociodemographic composition of the party's electorate. Our findings show that the electorate came to reflect the change in leadership after the party split. Furthermore, we are able to demonstrate that the pattern prevails in the newest election of 2023 under the leadership of Riikka Purra.

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Give Me Your Least Educated: Immigration, Education and Support for Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe

Cited by 8 publications

References 25 publications

Populism in the eye of the beholder? A conjoint experiment on citizens’ identification of populists

Populism in the eye of the beholder? A conjoint experiment on citizens’ identification of populists

An Economic Understanding of Populism: A Conceptual Framework of the Demand and the Supply Side of Populism

Can a change in the leadership of a populist radical right party be traced among voters? The case of the Finns Party

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