Giving Aid Effectively: The Politics of Environmental Performance and Selectivity at Multilateral Development Banks

When Does Transparency Improve Institutional Performance? Evidence from 20,000 Projects in 183 Countries

“…The first is a project correction effect whereby an appeal concerning a given project leads to performance‐enhancing modifications to this same project, whether by generating new information about its design or implementation (if the appeal is successful) or by prompting officials to pay greater attention to potential performance threats (if the appeal is unsuccessful). The second is a shadow of the future effect whereby officials strengthen project design and implementation in anticipation of future appeals that could reveal performance problems (Buntaine 2016). As the Bartın case suggests, even ATI requests and appeals that concern completed projects (and are ultimately denied) can increase bureaucrats’ awareness that they are being monitored.…”

“…First, ATI policies with appeals mechanisms should lead to greater improvement in project performance when recipient countries are characterized by higher levels of bottom‐up accountability, particularly in the form of civic engagement and press freedom. In many countries, citizens have limited opportunities to engage in sustained collective action or to access reliable information about public agencies via the media, making them less likely to learn about and utilize ATI policies; to activate appeals mechanisms when ATI requests are denied; and to leverage information from successful requests or appeals to pressure donors and recipient governments to address project problems (Buntaine 2016). Second, the performance payoff of well‐enforced ATI policies should be larger when recipient countries lack characteristics of good governance, such as the rule of law and limited corruption, which reduce the likelihood of project problems and create alternative channels through which stakeholders can obtain information about and demand action to address such issues.…”

“…In line with a growing literature on foreign aid effectiveness, we measure project performance using holistic, ex post success ratings assigned by donor staff and independent evaluation experts (Buntaine 2016; Denizer, Kaufmann, and Kraay 2013; Dreher et al. 2013; Honig 2018, 2019).…”

“…Our findings suggest an additional channel through which they can improve governance outcomes, namely, ensuring reliable mechanism enforcement. Finally, the study adds to a burgeoning literature on the effectiveness of foreign aid and donor agencies by examining the role of institutionalized transparency in shaping the impact of international development assistance (Buntaine 2016; Denizer, Kaufmann, and Kraay 2013; Dreher et al. 2013; Honig, 2018, 2019; Lall, 2017, 2021; Winters 2014).…”

Biodiversity conservation funding in Bhutan: Thematic, temporal, and spatial trends over four decades

“…Research on funding allocation has focused on global analyses (Miller, 2014), specific donor types (e.g., private foundations (Larson et al, 2016; Zavaleta et al, 2008), NGOs (Brockington & Scholfield, 2010; Halpern et al, 2006), multilateral (Buntaine, 2016; Hickey & Pimm, 2011) and bilateral donors (Corson, 2016)), or conservation actions such as protected areas (Bruner et al, 2004; de Oliveira & Bernard, 2017; Mansourian & Dudley, 2008). Other studies have focused on conservation funding at broad regional scales, such as the Amazon (De La Mata & Riega‐Campos, 2014), Latin America and the Caribbean (Bovarnick et al, 2010; Castro et al, 2001), and sub‐Saharan Africa (Brockington & Scholfield, 2010).…”