Giving little by little: Dynamic voluntary contribution games

Duffy, John; Ochs, Jack; Vesterlund, Lise

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2007.04.001

Cited by 74 publications

(57 citation statements)

References 19 publications

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“…A round-by-round Wilcoxon signed-rank test shows that while there is no difference between initial and final tentative quantities, implemented quantities are significantly lower than initially prepared ones. 17 The median and modal choices in the stochastic revision market also imply that several participants in fact behaved similar to the trigger strategy equilibrium path identified in the theoretical model of Kamada and Kandori (2015). Players start with quantities that are lower than the static Nash equilibrium of 16 and they remain there till a cut-off time.…”

Section: Dynamics Of Quantity Adjustmentmentioning

confidence: 58%

Action Revision, Information and Collusion in an Experimental Duopoly Market

Roy

2017

SSRN Journal

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Section: Dynamics Of Quantity Adjustmentmentioning

confidence: 58%

Action Revision, Information and Collusion in an Experimental Duopoly Market

Roy

2017

SSRN Journal

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“…A joint chi-square nonparametric test indicates that the difference in the provision rates is not statistically significant (p-value = 0.530). 5 By contrast, when the value of the good is low (A = 1.5), the provision rate decreases sharply to 0.10 when T = 1, while remaining at 0.47 when T = 2 and 0.678 when T = 5. These provision rates are significantly different at all conventional significance levels (p-value = 0.000).…”

Section: The Time Effect (T )mentioning

confidence: 96%

Sequential equilibrium in monotone games: A theory-based analysis of experimental data

Choi

Gale

Kariv

2008

Journal of Economic Theory

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A monotone game is an extensive-form game with complete information, simultaneous moves and an irreversibility structure on strategies. It captures a variety of situations in which players make partial commitments and allows us to characterize conditions under which equilibria result in socially desirable outcomes. However, since the game has many equilibrium outcomes, the theory lacks predictive power. To produce stronger predictions, one can restrict attention to the set of sequential equilibria, or Markov equilibria, or symmetric equilibria, or pure-strategy equilibria. This paper explores the relationship between equilibrium behavior in a class of monotone games, namely voluntary * This research was supported by the Center for Experimental Social Sciences (C.E.S.S.) and the C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics at New York University. We thank Tom Palfrey for detailed comments and suggestions. We also thank an associate editor and two anonymous referees for their comments. The paper has benefited from suggestions by the participants of seminars at several universities, the AEA 2007 annual meeting in Chicago, the ESA Asia-Pacific Regional 1 contribution games, and the behavior of human subjects in an experimental setting. We find evidence of both pure-and mixed-strategy equilibria and several key features of the symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium (SMPE) in the data. To judge how well the SMPE fits the data, we estimate a model of Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE) Palfrey 1995, 1998) and find that the decision rules of the QRE model are qualitatively very similar to the empirical choice probabilities.JEL Classification Numbers: D82, D83, C92.

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“…There has been a growing literature in experimental economics looking at different ways in which leadership can affect outcome in public goods games through information signalling (Potters et al 2007), leader's ability to exclude followers (Guth et al 2007) or leader's social status (Kumru and Vesterlund 2010). Even in the simplest case of leadership without any asymmetric information or additional powers, there is evidence of positive influence of leadership on overall contribution (Moxnes and Heijden 2003;Duffy et al 2007;Jack and Recalde 2015). The 'leader' contributes more to set a good example and trigger reciprocity from other players.…”

Section: Experimental Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Enhancing coordination in water management through communication tools: results from experimental games in Coastal Bangladesh

Mitra¹,

Buisson²,

Bastakoti³

2017

International Journal of the Commons

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Canal siltation is a pervasive problem in coastal Bangladesh causing water-logging and losses in crop yield. Although timely maintenance of canals through regular contributions from the community can solve this problem, it often breaks down because of the free riding issue, a common feature in the provision of public goods. Previous literature on experimental games has shown how different communication strategies or leadership can help to achieve coordination. We conducted experimental games with the aims to: (i) determine the effectiveness of these different strategies in the specific problem of maintenance of canal; and (ii) compare the relative effectiveness of different communication mechanisms or leadership. Playing these games was also a part of a participatory action research approach with the idea that community members would have a clearer understanding of the incentives and constraints of contribution for canal maintenance. The basic insight from our study is that any institution that enables more information sharing about both the intended contribution and setting the group norm translates into better coordination among the users to increase the group income towards Pareto Optimum outcomes. The lessons from these games could potentially open up a forum of discussion and help the villagers in their future communications as a tool for understanding and testing different alternatives for community manage-

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Giving little by little: Dynamic voluntary contribution games

Cited by 74 publications

References 19 publications

Action Revision, Information and Collusion in an Experimental Duopoly Market

Action Revision, Information and Collusion in an Experimental Duopoly Market

Sequential equilibrium in monotone games: A theory-based analysis of experimental data

Enhancing coordination in water management through communication tools: results from experimental games in Coastal Bangladesh

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Giving little by little: Dynamic voluntary contribution games

Cited by 74 publications

References 19 publications

Action Revision, Information and Collusion in an Experimental Duopoly Market

Action Revision, Information and Collusion in an Experimental Duopoly Market

Sequential equilibrium in monotone games: A theory-based analysis of experimental data

Enhancing coordination in water management through ­communication tools: results from experimental games in Coastal Bangladesh

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Product

Resources

About

Enhancing coordination in water management through communication tools: results from experimental games in Coastal Bangladesh