Global Climate Governance Between Hard and Soft Law: Can the Paris Agreement’s ‘Crème Brûlée’ Approach Enhance Ecological Reflexivity?

Achieving the ambitious targets of the Paris Agreement: the role of key actors

“…The agreement's key value lies in its universality, with broad participation 1 and the same obligation to pledge, report and review for all parties (Victor 2015). The ambition mechanism enshrined in the agreement relies on a requirement for all parties to voluntarily propose increasingly ambitious nationally determined contributions (NDCs) every five years, as part of a 'pledge and review' governance system (Pickering et al 2019). 2020-21 will likely provide evidence of enhanced ambition as parties are set to report new NDCs in the run-up to the 26th Conference of the Parties in Glasgow.…”

Environmental-agreement design and political ideology in democracies

“…11 As a result, leftist governments also focus on this component when trying to negotiate agreement designs that facilitate effectiveness. Third, the pattern I identify could be consistent with the claim that a mix of hard and soft-law elements is the most effective design approach (see Skjaerseth et al, 2006;Pickering et al, 2019;Wanner, 2021). That is, leftist governments then focus on those hard-law components that increase effectiveness, but leave out other more legalized design aspects that may not be related to higher efficacy.…”

“…Soft law requirements are not enforceable and ambiguous by nature. Although soft-law elements can be effective when, e.g., flexibility is enhanced or political pressure on laggards is increased (e.g., Skjaerseth et al, 2006;Pickering et al, 2019;Wanner, 2021), it tends to be seen as less suitable for solving an institution's underlying problem effectively (see Wettestad, 1999;Koremenos et al, 2001;Young & Stokke, 2020;Miles et al, 2001;Böhmelt & Pilster, 2010;Young, 2011;Böhmelt & Butkutė, 2018). Hard law is potentially more effective as it can be enforced and, thus, is "more credible"-as states are willing to make greater concessions and accept more cuts into own sovereignty, they signal more convincingly that they will abide by an agreement's terms.…”

“…On the one hand, left-leaning executives in democracies tend to be generally more environmental-friendly than their right-wing and center counterparts, which implies that they probably favor designs that are more conducive to effective institutions. Soft-law elements can be effective under some circumstances when, e.g., they allow for greater flexibility (e.g., Skjaerseth et al, 2006;Pickering et al, 2019;Wanner, 2021), but it is generally hard law and more legalized treaties that are seen as facilitators of effective problem-solving institutions (see Wettestad, 1999;Koremenos et al, 2001;Mitchell, 2006;Young & Stokke, 2020;Miles et al, 2001;Böhmelt & Pilster, 2010;Young, 2011;Böhmelt & Butkutė, 2018;Böhmelt & Spilker, 2016). On the other hand, leftist democratic governments are usually less concerned about sovereignty costs.…”

Achieving Ecological Reflexivity: The Limits of Deliberation and the Alternative of Free-Market-Environmentalism

“…While orthodox environmental economics has no room for ecological reflexivity, it is widely hailed as central to effective environmental governance in the ascendent circles of environmental policy which we collectively refer to as environmental political economy [5][6][7]. Some scholars in environmental political economy go even as far as to argue that reflexivity is the "essential, and possibly the first, virtue for governance in the Anthropocene" [3] (p. 1).…”