Global governance behind closed doors: The IMF boardroom, the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, and the intersection of material power and norm stabilisation in global politics

Clegg, Liam

doi:10.1007/s11558-011-9133-6

Cited by 11 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 68 publications

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“…The proliferation of different lending arrangements that countries can access based on their level of economic development and the type of economic challenges they face has institutionalized the principle of differential treatment based on borrowers' resource needs and repayment abilities (IMF ). This has expanded the potential for programs to be tailored to local economic circumstances without attracting charges of IMF favoritism (Broome ; Clegg ). There is nonetheless a thin line between differential treatment based on borrowers' resource needs and preferential treatment based on their systemic importance (Pop‐Eleches ).…”

Section: Continuity and Change In Imf Policy Advice To Borrowersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Back to Basics: The Great Recession and the Narrowing of IMF Policy Advice

Broome

2014

Governance

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Abstract:This article contributes to the literature on the dynamics of change and continuity in the International Monetary Fund's (IMF's) policy paradigm. The IMF embarked on a process of 'streamlining conditionality' during the 2000s, but many observers have argued that the IMF's policy paradigm from the 1990s remains intact. This article examines whether the scope of the IMF's policy advice to borrowers during the Great Recession narrowed in comparison with its advice to borrowers during the heyday of the Washington consensus in the 1980s and 1990s. The article uses qualitative content analysis to establish the frequency of a series of policy dialogue indicators in four sample sets of countries requesting IMF stand-by arrangements (SBAs) over three decades. The evidence suggests that contemporary IMF policy advice to borrowers continues to stress the importance of fiscal consolidation, with reduced emphasis on promoting the structural economic reforms associated with the Washington consensus era.

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Section: Continuity and Change In Imf Policy Advice To Borrowersmentioning

confidence: 99%

Back to Basics: The Great Recession and the Narrowing of IMF Policy Advice

Broome

2014

Governance

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“…Bureaucratic culture is indeed regarded as one of the primary factors that helps to explain why IOs have difficulties in adapting their policies to changed economic and political circumstances (Barnett and Finnemore 2004; Momani 2007). As Liam Clegg (2011) notes, ‘the dominant “bureaucratic culture” serves to fix the “points of reference” around which discussions of policy reform take place.’ Bureaucratic inertia, usually associated with deference towards the preferences of the most powerful shareholders, usually prevents change from occurring in the international financial institutions (Babb 2013). This constraint leads to a dynamic of change that follows the punctuated model: stasis prevails until some event—be it new recruitment (Chwieroth 2008) or a new leadership (Weaver 2008, 108)—ruptures the status quo and pushes new and alternative ideas into the debate.…”

Section: Agents Institutions and Ideational Changementioning

confidence: 99%

The Institutional Roots of Incremental Ideational Change: The IMF and Capital Controls after the Global Financial Crisis

Moschella¹

2014

The British Journal of Politics and International Relations

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This article • Contributes to the literature on ideational change by bringing to the surface an incremental ideational dynamic after major crises that differs from the well-known punctuated dynamic; • Explains the incremental dynamic of ideational change after a major crisis based on the flexibility of the institutional environment in which actors operate. Specifically, rather than preventing change until an explosion of radical change occurs, institutional frictions may also allow for successive adjustments over time; • Illustrates the theoretical arguments by examining the changes that have taken place in the IMF's thinking on capital controls since the start of the 2008 crisis; • Traces one of the most debated developments in the post-crisis international political economy, namely the rehabilitation of capital controls.Although much scholarly attention has been devoted to examining the punctuated dynamics of ideational change, other dynamics exist. Ideational change may well occur incrementally in ordinary times or, as this study shows, can also materialise after a major shock, such as a financial and economic crisis. By examining the IMF's new approach to capital controls in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, the article demonstrates that the non-punctuated nature of ideational change can be explained in light of the enabling (and not solely constraining) features of the institutional context in which actors operate. Rather than preventing change until an explosion of radical change occurs, institutional frictions may also allow for successive adjustments over time. They may in fact allow for a gradual release of pressure, thereby preventing the impending explosion.

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“…Further research could clarify why the IMF's position as regards domestic creditors has been an instance of continuity. Of relevance here could be research on principal–agent politics at the board level (Clegg ), the role of staff research (Ban ; Broome and Seabrooke ; Chwieroth ; Seabrooke ), or some combination of the two (Gallagher ).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Banking on Seniority: The IMF and the Sovereign's Creditors

Erce

2014

Governance

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The programs designed by the International Monetary Fund during the Global Financial Crisis have shown more awareness of the importance of domestic demand for the prospects of economic recovery. Yet, the IMF has continued to do little about the late payments made by governments to domestic creditors and suppliers. In contrast, the greater protection historically awarded by the IMF to foreign creditors has endured throughout the recent crisis. The paper suggests that, in order to adequately balance foreign creditor seniority and growth objectives, the IMF may sometimes need to emphasize equitable burden-sharing across categories of creditors rather than privilege the interests of international bond markets. JEL codes: E6, F5

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Global governance behind closed doors: The IMF boardroom, the Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility, and the intersection of material power and norm stabilisation in global politics

Cited by 11 publications

References 68 publications

Back to Basics: The Great Recession and the Narrowing of IMF Policy Advice

Back to Basics: The Great Recession and the Narrowing of IMF Policy Advice

The Institutional Roots of Incremental Ideational Change: The IMF and Capital Controls after the Global Financial Crisis

Banking on Seniority: The IMF and the Sovereign's Creditors

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