This paper presents a framework for analyzing how bounded rationality affects monetary and fiscal policy. The model is a tractable and parsimonious enrichment of the widely-used New Keynesian model -with one main new parameter, which quantifies how poorly agents understand future policy and its impact. That myopia parameter in turn affects the power of monetary and fiscal policy in a microfounded general equilibrium.A number of consequences emerge. First, fiscal stimulus or "helicopter drops of money" are powerful and, indeed, pull the economy out of the zero lower bound. More generally, the model allows for the joint analysis of optimal monetary and fiscal policy. Second, the model helps solve the "forward guidance puzzle," the fact that in the rational model, shocks to very distant rates have a very powerful impact on today's consumption and inflation: because the agent is de facto myopic, this effect is muted. Third, the zero lower bound is much less costly than in the traditional model. Fourth, even with passive monetary policy, equilibrium is determinate, whereas the traditional rational model generates multiple equilibria, which reduce its predictive power. Fifth, optimal policy changes qualitatively: the optimal commitment policy with rational agents demands "nominal GDP targeting"; this is not the case with behavioral firms, as the benefits of commitment are less strong with myopic firms. Sixth, the model is "neo-Fisherian" in the long run, but Keynesian in the short run -something that has proven difficult for other models to achieve: a permanent rise in the interest rate decreases inflation in the short run but increases it in the long run. The non-standard behavioral features of the model seem warranted by the empirical evidence. * xgabaix@fas.harvard.edu. I thank Igor Cesarec, Vu Chau and Wu Di for excellent research assistance. For useful comments I thank