According to Yogi Berra, 'the future ain't what it used to be' (Scott 2019). Indeed, this is one of his better observations. The future of work is not a new topic despite the current acres of newsprint that suggest it is. We can go back to Alvin Toffler in 1970-'too much change in too short a period of time'-but, also, many others, from Jeremy Rifkin, who in 1995 predicted the end of work, to more recent publications that claim to be able to predict future trends (e.g. Gratton 2011; Ross 2016; McKinsey 2017). Moreover, for many years we saw two grand narratives. One offered a utopian perspective of the leisure society (Keynes thought 15 hours of work would be enough for a good living by 2030), where for those at work, they existed as empowered knowledge workers. The other narrative envisaged a darker future, featuring intensification, surveillance, casualisation, austerity, financialisation, low pay, long hours, the platform economy and digital technology. In short, in the latter narrative, working life is portrayed as nasty, brutish and long. We see considerable debate at present in both the academic world and the wider community about the direction of work and the desirability of developments both for work and life outside work. A major part of this debate is also influenced by the globalisation of work, the impact of new technologies, and the shift of skills and knowledge development to low-cost labour countries (Howcroft and Taylor 2014). However, these stylised accounts lack granularity and are not based on interrogating the evidence so much as putting together a picture by using a series of often bold predictions, or by using one or two case studies to make generalisations about the future of work. Indeed, prediction is often mixed with prescription and description. Too much of the literature on the future of work favours broad brush strokes in which the world is one of paradigm shifts. Variously, we are told we are in the midst of the fourth industrial revolution, the second machine age, the new economy (Ross 2016). These new, often shaky, assumptions are favoured over notions of contestation, unevenness and choice. It is as