Globalization and Capital Taxation in Consensus and Majoritarian Democracies

Hays, Jude C.

doi:10.1353/wp.2004.0004

Cited by 148 publications

(79 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…This can be done in a model, such as Plümper et al (2008); or more simply, Ha (2008) uses an institutional veto player model to examine the impact of globalization on welfare spending, by arguing that the number of veto players limited the ability of government to put these reforms into effect. This, in turn, links to Hays's (2003) finding about capital taxation. Nevertheless, even with these advances, it is hard to unpick the multi-causal nature of policy changes in advanced democracies (see the review by Zohlnhöfer et al 2017).…”

Section: Convergence and Globalizationsupporting

confidence: 63%

“…What constrains policy makers is a set of national factors, such as the size of the country, norms about fairness and budget constraints. Hays (2003) also finds convergence with the type of political institutions being important. There is no evidence for a race to the bottom in other policy fields, such as labour regulation and environmental standards.…”

Section: Convergence and Globalizationmentioning

confidence: 85%

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Theories of policy change and variation reconsidered: a prospectus for the political economy of public policy

John

2017

Policy Sci

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Studies of decision-making in public policy may be conceived as three distinct ages of theory building and testing. The first was the classic period of studies of decisionmaking and rationality; the second was the age of synthesis when theories of decisionmaking were blended into accounts of agenda setting. The third-which is starting to take shape-is the age of the political economy of public policy, drawing on models and methods that have been applied to the study of international relations and comparative politics, which are increasingly addressing issues in public policy. The paper's argument offers a challenge to public policy scholars to use theory and approaches from political economy and to integrate them with classic and synthetic approaches. Insights from public policy approaches from the first two ages could also inform the political economy of public policy. The paper contains a review of the development of public policy theory in the 1990s; it provides an account of the recent period as one of relative stability; it then presents work in comparative political economy as examples of research on public policy.Keywords Public policy Á Political economy Á Decision-making So far there have been two ages in the study of decision-making in public policy: the firstthe classic period-was when key terms were defined. Debates took place about the nature of decision-making and the extent to which full information prevails. It was the time when incrementalism, the rational model, the stages heuristic and sectoral representations of decision-making processes were elaborated, notably set out as the second two lens in Allison's influential Essence of Decision (1971). The second and synthetic age was of complex accounts of decision-making, which produced the policy advocacy coalition framework, the garbage can and policy window metaphors, and the punctuated equilibrium model-the currency of many of today's policy scholars. In these frameworks of analysis,

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Section: Convergence and Globalizationsupporting

confidence: 63%

Section: Convergence and Globalizationmentioning

confidence: 85%

Theories of policy change and variation reconsidered: a prospectus for the political economy of public policy

John

2017

Policy Sci

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“…26 A general problem in this debate is that a high share of wealthy people can be both a cause and a consequence of tax reforms, especially in Switzerland, where voters can influence tax decisions with direct democratic rights. See Schmidheiny 2005. 27 Hallerberg and Basinger 1998;Swank and Steinmo 2002;Hays 2003;Basinger and Hallerberg 2004;Swank 2006;Plümper, Troeger, and Winner 2009;Cao 2010. 28 Radaelli and Kraemer 2008;Genschel, Kemmerling, and Seils 2011;Genschel and Schwarz 2011. 29 Braun and Gilardi 2006;Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2006;Dobbin, Simmons, and Garrett 2007;Gilardi 2012.…”

Section: How Socialization May Attenuate Competitionmentioning

confidence: 99%

How Socialization Attenuates Tax Competition

Gilardi¹,

Wasserfallen²

2014

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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Tax competition is the quintessential example of policy interdependence. The general idea is that tax changes in one jurisdiction lead to similar changes in others. However, research has shown that institutional and political constraints limit competition. This article develops another argument: that socialization among policy makers attenuates competitive dynamics by setting limits to the extent of competition that is considered acceptable. Using fine-grained Swiss data and spatial econometric techniques, it shows that personal income tax rates are more strongly correlated among competitors that do not participate in the same intergovernmental organizations. This finding implies that, to some extent, the detrimental consequences of competition can be mitigated by fostering institutionalized forms of interaction among policy makers.

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“…One good example of this possibility is globalization. The important role of union power and top marginal tax on the top 1% revealed in this article draws our attention to the literature on the impact of globalization on union density and taxation policy (Western 1998;Swank 1998;Brady, Beckfield, and Zhao 2007;Hays 2003;Scruggs and Lange 2002). To the extent that globalization erodes union power (for example through deindustrialization) and increases the pressure towards lowering top marginal taxes, globalization may have created a favorable "context" for the abovenoted self-reinforcing cycle of income, wealth, and power concentration in politics.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 92%

Power, Markets, and Top Income Shares

Huber¹,

Huo

Stephens³

2015

SSRN Journal

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The Kellogg Institute for International Studies at the University of Notre Dame has built an international reputation by bringing the best of interdisciplinary scholarly inquiry to bear on democratization, human development, and other research themes relevant to contemporary societies around the world.Together, more than 100 faculty and visiting fellows as well as both graduate and undergraduate students make up the Kellogg community of scholars. Founded in 1982, the Institute promotes research, provides students with exceptional educational opportunities, and builds linkages across campus and around the world. The Kellogg Working Paper Series:! Shares work-in-progress in a timely way before final publication in scholarly books and journals ABSTRACTThe rise of the super-rich has attracted much political and academic attention in recent years. However, to date there have been few attempts to explain the cross-national variation in the recent rise of very top incomes. Drawing on the World Top Incomes Database, we study the income share of the top 1% in almost all current postindustrial democracies from 1975 to 2012. We find that extreme income concentration at the very top is a predominantly political phenomenon, not the outcome of economic changes. Top income shares are largely unrelated to economic growth, increased knowledge-intensive production, export competitiveness, market size, financialization, and wealth accumulation. Instead, they are driven by various political and policy changes that reflect a decline in the relative power and resources of labor, such as union density and centralization, secular-right governments, and cuts in top marginal income tax rates as well as in public spending on education. RESUMENEn los últimos años, el ascenso de los super-ricos atrajo mucha atención política y académica. Sin embargo, hasta el momento se hicieron pocos intentos de explicar la variación internacional en el crecimiento reciente de los ingresos más altos. Tomando información de la Base Mundial de Datos sobre los Ingresos más Altos (World Top Incomes Database) estudiamos la porción del ingreso del 1% superior en casi todas las democracias postindustriales actuales desde 1975 hasta 2012. Encontramos que la extrema concentración del ingreso en la cúspide es un fenómeno predominantemente político y no resulta de cambios económicos. La participación de los ingresos superiores no está relacionada en ninguna medida significativa con el crecimiento económico, un aumento en la producción que hace un uso intensivo del conocimiento, la competitividad de las exportaciones, el tamaño de los mercados, el desarrollo del sector financiero o la acumulación de riqueza. En cambio, está guiada por varios cambios en la política y en las políticas que reflejan una declinación en el poder relativo y en los recursos de los trabajadores, tales como la densidad sindical y la centralización, los gobiernos seculares de derechas y las reducciones tanto en las tasas marginales superiores de impuestos sobre los ingresos como en el gasto púb...

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Globalization and Capital Taxation in Consensus and Majoritarian Democracies

Cited by 148 publications

References 34 publications

Theories of policy change and variation reconsidered: a prospectus for the political economy of public policy

Theories of policy change and variation reconsidered: a prospectus for the political economy of public policy

How Socialization Attenuates Tax Competition

Power, Markets, and Top Income Shares

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