2010
DOI: 10.1167/6.6.958
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Goal bias in non-linguistic Motion event representations: The role of intentionality

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Cited by 3 publications
(7 citation statements)
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“…These results confirm prior evidence about the asymmetrical representation of Source and Goal information (Lakusta & Landau, 2007): In committing motion events to memory, Source objects are encoded in much less detail than Goal objects. Extending earlier results, the present data show that the Source‐Goal object asymmetry holds even when other aspects of the motion event are kept the same (including the event, relation, and type of object involved).…”
Section: Experiments 1a: Encoding Source/goal Objects In Memorysupporting
confidence: 87%
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“…These results confirm prior evidence about the asymmetrical representation of Source and Goal information (Lakusta & Landau, 2007): In committing motion events to memory, Source objects are encoded in much less detail than Goal objects. Extending earlier results, the present data show that the Source‐Goal object asymmetry holds even when other aspects of the motion event are kept the same (including the event, relation, and type of object involved).…”
Section: Experiments 1a: Encoding Source/goal Objects In Memorysupporting
confidence: 87%
“…There is evidence that the nonlinguistic preference for motion endpoints may only be present for intentional actions. For instance, the Goal bias in memory disappears for events with inanimate agents (e.g., a tissue falling off a magazine onto a book; Lakusta, Wessel, & Landau, 2006; Lakusta & Carey, 2008), or in the presence of intentional cues that make Goals less salient (Lakusta, 2005; Lakusta & Landau, 2007; Landau, 2010). Similarly, infants do not confer privileged status to motion endpoints when motion events have an inanimate/nonintentional agent (Lakusta & Carey, 2008), even though infants encode the Goal of an (animate) agent’s reach, point, and gaze (Woodward, 1998, 2003; Woodward & Guajardo, 2002) and even extend Goal reasoning to self‐propelled, rationally behaving inanimate objects (Csibra, Bíró, Koós, & Gergely, 2003; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005).…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…Furthermore, Papafragou (2010) found evidence for a goal bias when testing how adults and 4‐ and 5‐year‐old children remember goal and source landmark objects in computer animated events depicting an animate figure move from one object to another object (e.g., a fairy flying from a flower to a tree). Papafragou (2010) also reported a goal bias when testing adults’ and children’s memory for goal and source spatial relations in events portraying a self‐propelled inanimate object move to (or from) a goal (or source) reference object (e.g., a soccer ball moving onto a square) (see also Lakusta, 2005; Lakusta & Landau, 2007). A goal bias has also been reported by Regier and Zheng (2007), who tested discrimination of source and goal spatial relations.…”
Section: 3 the Current Studymentioning
confidence: 99%