“…There is evidence that the nonlinguistic preference for motion endpoints may only be present for intentional actions. For instance, the Goal bias in memory disappears for events with inanimate agents (e.g., a tissue falling off a magazine onto a book; Lakusta, Wessel, & Landau, 2006; Lakusta & Carey, 2008), or in the presence of intentional cues that make Goals less salient (Lakusta, 2005; Lakusta & Landau, 2007; Landau, 2010). Similarly, infants do not confer privileged status to motion endpoints when motion events have an inanimate/nonintentional agent (Lakusta & Carey, 2008), even though infants encode the Goal of an (animate) agent’s reach, point, and gaze (Woodward, 1998, 2003; Woodward & Guajardo, 2002) and even extend Goal reasoning to self‐propelled, rationally behaving inanimate objects (Csibra, Bíró, Koós, & Gergely, 2003; Luo & Baillargeon, 2005).…”