God and Moral Obligation

Evans, C. Stephen

doi:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199696680.001.0001

Cited by 63 publications

(9 citation statements)

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“…46-50). 23 (Evans 2013) distinguishes two aspects of a DCT, which he terms the "modal status thesis" and the "divine discretion thesis." Evans argues that only the former is actually essential to a DCT, which means that nonvoluntaristic forms of a DCT are possible.…”

Section: Does Darwall Need God As Part Of the Story For His Account To Work?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Darwall’s Morality of Accountability Require Moral Realism? (And Would It Be Strengthened by Adding God to the Story?)

Evans

2021

Religions

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Stephen Darwall has developed an account of moral obligations as grounded in “second-personal reasons,” which was developed in conversation with early modern “theological voluntarists” who were divine command theorists. For Darwall, morality does not require accountability to God; humans as autonomous moral agents are the source of moral obligations. In this paper, I try to show that Darwall is vulnerable to some objections made against divine command theories. There are responses Darwall could make that have parallels to those given by divine command theorists. However, those responses require moral realism, while Darwall’s project is often seen as being inspired by metaethical constructivism. Finally, I suggest that Darwall’s view could be further strengthened by the addition of God to the story.

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Section: Does Darwall Need God As Part Of the Story For His Account To Work?mentioning

confidence: 99%

Does Darwall’s Morality of Accountability Require Moral Realism? (And Would It Be Strengthened by Adding God to the Story?)

Evans

2021

Religions

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“…For example, Quinn (1979), Adams (1987), Alston (1990), Baggett andWalls (2011), andEvans (2013) argue that the proponents of DCM are well advised to reject DCM-Goodness-Meaning and, instead, endorse a version of DCM that is formulated in deontological terms (e.g. moral obligations, moral rightness, or moral wrongness).…”

Section: Attempted Defence: Resorting To Deontological Terminologymentioning

confidence: 99%

Maitzen’s Objection from God’s Goodness

Kremers

2021

SOPHIA

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Stephen Maitzen argues that divine command metaethics must be mistaken because it is committed to the implausible assumption that the sentence 'God is (morally) good' is a tautology. In this article, I show that a charitable interpretation of R. M. Adams' version of divine command metaethics is not committed to accepting this assumption. I conclude that Maitzen's objection merely manages to refute a strawman version of divine command metaethics.

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“…This authority, Evans adds, might even be due to "God's ownership rights as creator"! (Evans 2013, If God exists, I should add, we would also be utterly insignificant compared to Him. By contrast, as I've argued elsewhere, in a naturalist universe we have at least a shot at being truly cosmically significant (Kahane 2014).…”

Section: Worse In Respect: Substancementioning

confidence: 99%