God, fatalism, and temporal ontology

Abstract

Theological incompatibility arguments suggest God's comprehensive foreknowledge is incompatible with human free will. Logical incompatibility arguments suggest a complete set of truths about the future is logically incompatible with human free will. Of the two, most think theological incompatibility is the more severe problem; but hardly anyone thinks either kind of argument presents a real threat to free will. I will argue, however, that sound theological and logical incompatibility arguments exist and that, in fact, logical incompatibly is the more severe problem. A deep analysis of the arguments will reveal that, to avoid a fatalist conclusion, we must reject bivalence and adopt a specific kind of temporal ontology (presentism), which also forces the theist to embrace open theism.

Time, foreknowledge, and alternative possibilities

“…David Kyle Johnson develops this case in a recent contribution to the debate. He argues that a temporally preceding ontological necessity conflicting with the freedom of your future choice would be generated, not only by divine foreknowledge, but also by isotemporalism by itself (Johnson (2009), 435–454). In brief, Johnson's argument concerning isotemporalism goes like this: Libertarian freedom entails that, ‘An action is free only if not performing the action is ontologically possible before the action is performed.’ Johnson explains ontological possibility,Something is now-ontologically possible if and only if it is not contrary to (in that it is not the opposite of) anything that exists.…”

“…Y exists) and positing the existence of X is inconsistent with positing the existence of Y. (Johnson (2009), 438)But isotemporalism entails that what we call the future and all it contains, along with the past and the present, exists in ‘determinate reality’. It does not exist ‘today’, but it exists simpliciter .…”

“…It also requires a denial of the principle of bivalence regarding propositions about future free choices since that would render the same result as isotemporalism. And God, if there is a God, does not know future free choices (Johnson (2009), 448–452).…”

“…Y exists) and positing the existence of X is inconsistent with positing the existence of Y. (Johnson (2009), 438)…”

“…Johnson's second defence of the intuition that a choice must be ontologically open before it is made has to do with a key aspect of the experience of choice. As we deliberate, ‘we assume that whether or not the action is going to be performed is yet to be determined … if the action is ontologically necessary before it is performed, the central assumption we make in deliberation is grossly mistaken’ (Johnson (2009), 440–441). If possible one wants to avoid claiming that a ubiquitous assumption is grossly mistaken, and so we should allow the intuition.…”