God, Time and the Kalām Cosmological Argument

Bobier, Christopher

doi:10.1007/s11841-013-0362-4

Cited by 6 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 4 publications

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“…This dynamic has pressured theologians to make their religions compatible with modern science. The effort to gain approval from modern science is evident in the work of Nidhal Guessoum and Ehsan Masood in the Islamic world, as well as among Christian apologists like William Lane Craig (Bobier 2013;Marchant 2009;Rofiq and Hasbi 2021).…”

Section: The Hegemony Of Western Conception Of Religion and Its Manif...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Deconstructing the Privileged Status of Religion over the Status of Belief as the Root of Discrimination towards Kejawen Community

Wasisto

2024

JSAI

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The Kejawen community, recognized as a belief system rather than a formal religion, faces systemic discrimination in Indonesia. This distinction underpins the country's recognition of its political and legal status, thereby impeding the rights of Indigenous practitioners, including Kejawen followers. Several factors contribute to this systemic discrimination: the Western conception of religion, the dichotomy between religion and belief enshrined in Article 29 of the 1945 Indonesian Constitution, the narrow definition of religion by the Indonesian Department of Religion, the association of indigenous beliefs with communism post-1965, and the application of blasphemy laws aimed at "purifying" religion while sidelining belief systems. This study aims to explore the discriminative dynamics against Kejawen within the binary framework of religion versus belief through qualitative research and critical discourse analysis. It seeks to uncover the ambiguity surrounding the concept of religion in Indonesia, drawing on a wide range of sources, including historical narratives, academic studies, relevant legislation, and judicial rulings. This research indicates a significant bias rooted in the differentiation between "religion" and "belief," primarily originating from Western perspectives on religion. This bias has led to the marginalization of Kejawen and other similar spiritual practices, which are often viewed as lesser compared to world religions.

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Section: The Hegemony Of Western Conception Of Religion and Its Manif...mentioning

confidence: 99%

Deconstructing the Privileged Status of Religion over the Status of Belief as the Root of Discrimination towards Kejawen Community

Wasisto

2024

JSAI

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“…Suppose that beginning-to-exist-2 did provide the correct analysis of beginning to exist. On Craig's 9 Bobier (2013) Supposing that God's life includes both temporal and non-temporal portions, we should not say that the atemporal portion of God's life precedes the temporal portion since the atemporal portion cannot enter into temporal relations such as before or after [Craig, 2001a, 267-268], [Helm, 2001a, 49], [Leftow, 2009, 290-291]. Friends of CCH, such as Craig, Erasmus, and Loke, have themselves argued that the atemporal portion of God's life is not before the temporal portion.…”

Section: Theological Accounts Of the Beginning Of The Cosmos Penultim...mentioning

confidence: 99%

A Modal Condition for the Beginning of the Universe

Linford¹

2022

Erkenn

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This paper considers two problems -one in philosophy of religion and another in philosophy of physics -and shows that the two problems have one solution. Some Christian philosophers have endorsed the views that (i) there was a first finitely long period of time, (ii) God is in time, and yet (iii) God did not have a beginning. If there was a first finitely long period of time and God is in time then there was a first finitely long period of time in God's life. But if God's life includes a first finitely long period of time, then, on one initially intuitive conception of beginning to exist, God began to exist. Thus, at first glance, (i)-(iii) are not mutually compatible. Meanwhile, on a variety of proposals for quantum gravity theories or interpretations of quantum theory, space-time is not fundamental to physical reality and instead can (somehow) be explained in terms of yet more fundamental physical substructures. As I show, there is a strong intuition that if space-time is not fundamental to physical reality, then, even if there were a first finitely long period in the life of physical reality, physical reality would be beginningless. Thus, both theistic philosophers and philosophers of physics have developed theories on which some beginningless entities have a first finitely long temporal period in their lives and so both groups should be interested in developing criteria that distinguish such entities from entities with a beginning. In this paper, I offer one necessary (but not sufficient) condition, namely, that entities that begin to exist are absent from the closest possible worlds without time. The view that I defend has one significant upshot: no sound argument can use the mere fact (if it is a fact) that past time is finite to reach the conclusion that the totality of physical reality had a beginning. PENULTIMATE DRAFT -FORTHCOMING IN ERKENNTNISthe view that while there is a first finitely long period of time in God's life, God's life was beginningless (Craig [2001a], Erasmus [2021], Loke [2017]). This view is conceptually problematic because, prima facie, to begin to exist just means that one's life included a finitely long initial period of time. On the other hand, as discussed below, a variety of contemporary physical theories and research programs are committed to the claim that the Cosmos is not fundamentally spatiotemporal (

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“…On the other hand, the purely philosophical arguments that Craig provides for (2) either presuppose a dynamic theory of time or preclude the metaphysical possibility of there being an actual infinite. 14 Moreover, in addition to being somewhat less than straightforward, Craig's understanding of what it means for something to begin to exist at a given moment both presupposes a dynamic theory of time and arguably applies to his conception of God (Bobier, 2013), raising the possibility that the causal principle in (1) might also apply to God along with the universe. 15 Finally, it might be wondered whether the argument for (2) developed here can be supplemented with evidence from modern physical cosmology as in Craig's argument.…”

Section: The Universe Began To Existmentioning

confidence: 99%

Toward a new kalām cosmological argument

Waters

2015

Cogent Arts & Humanities

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William Lane Craig has revived interest in the medieval kalām argument to the point where it is now one of the most discussed arguments for God's existence in the secondary literature. Still, the reception of Craig's argument among philosophers of religion has been mostly critical. In the interest of developing an argument that more philosophers of religion would be inclined to support, I will lay the philosophical groundwork for a new kalām cosmological argument that, in contrast with Craig's argument, does not adopt such controversial positions as the dynamic theory of time and the metaphysical impossibility of an actual infinite.

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God, Time and the Kalām Cosmological Argument

Cited by 6 publications

References 4 publications

Deconstructing the Privileged Status of Religion over the Status of Belief as the Root of Discrimination towards Kejawen Community

Deconstructing the Privileged Status of Religion over the Status of Belief as the Root of Discrimination towards Kejawen Community

A Modal Condition for the Beginning of the Universe

Toward a new kalām cosmological argument

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