Gods, Giants and Philosophers: On Being, Education and Dialogue in Plato’s Sophist 245e6-249d5

Larsen, Jens Kristian

doi:10.5040/9781350082526.ch-006

Cited by 1 publication

(2 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…20 Just like in Phd., 80b1, where the verb introduces the conclusion of the overall argument. Some critics have argued that the last argument is actually neither addressed to the Friends of the Forms nor to the Giants, but rather to Theaetetus; e. g. Larsen (2019), p. 118. Although I agree with Larsen about the importance of the educative dimension of the Gigantomachia passage, and with his emphasis on the involvement of Theaetetus in this last argument, I do not see that this is incompatible with the view that the Friends of the Forms and the Giants are also addressed.…”

Section: Overview Of the Argument And Analysis Of The First Prongmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although I agree with Larsen about the importance of the educative dimension of the Gigantomachia passage, and with his emphasis on the involvement of Theaetetus in this last argument, I do not see that this is incompatible with the view that the Friends of the Forms and the Giants are also addressed. 21 For an alternative reading according to which Theaetetus is actually raising the question for himself only, see Larsen (2019), p. 118.…”

Section: Overview Of the Argument And Analysis Of The First Prongmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Plato’s Master Argument for a Two-Kind Ontology in theSophist: A New Reading of the Final Argument of the Gigantomachia Passage (249b5–249c9)

Sabrier

2020

Apeiron

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper I defend a new reading of the final argument of the Gigantomachia passage of Plato’s Sophist (249b5–249c9), according to which it is an argument for a two-kind ontology, based on the distinction between the changing beings and the unchanging beings. This argument, I urge, is addressed not only to Platonists but to all philosophers – with one exception. My reading is based on the claim that this argument does not rely on the view that nous requires unchangeable objects – what I call the traditional reading – but on the view that nous itself is unchanging. The difference between the traditional reading and my reading is that on the former, Plato’s argument relies on a distinctive epistemological assumption, whereas on the latter, Plato’s argument is free from any such commitments. If the argument of this paper is along the right lines, then this implies that this argument has a much more far-reaching scope than critics have usually assumed. It also invites us to reconsider Plato’s approach to the question of being in the Sophist.

show abstract

Section: Overview Of the Argument And Analysis Of The First Prongmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Overview Of the Argument And Analysis Of The First Prongmentioning

confidence: 99%