Goff’s revelation thesis and the epistemology of colour discrimination

Abstract

In this paper, I raise an objection to Philip Goff's "Revelation Thesis" as articulated in his Consciousness and Fundamental Reality (Goff, 2017). In Section 1 I present the Revelation Thesis in the context of Goff's broader defence of pan-psychism. In Section 2 I argue that the Revelation Thesis entails the identity of indiscriminable phenomenal properties. In Section 3 I argue that the identity of indiscriminable phenomenal properties is false. The upshot is that the Revelation Thesis is false. Goff's Revelation Thesis The Role of the Revelation Thesis in Goff's ProgramCentral to Philip Goff's case against physicalism is what he calls the Direct Phenomenal Transparency Thesis. There are two components to this thesis: transparency, and direct phenomenal concepts. I summarize each in turn.* Forthcoming in Synthese please cite final draft † Thanks to Murat Aydede and two anonymous reviewers for helpful feedback on earlier drafts of this article.