Going, Going, Gone! A Swift Tour of Auction Theory and its Applications

Maasland, Emiel; Onderstal, Sander

doi:10.1007/s10645-006-9002-5

Cited by 13 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 92 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Fortunately it is possible to capture nearly all of the benefits of a continuous auction and still conduct the auction in a limited number of rounds, using the technique of intraround bids. 3 With intraround bids, bidders express their demands in each auction round at all price vectors along the line segment from the start-of-round price to the end-of-round price. In a traditional clock auction, price may increase from say $90 to $100 in a round, but the bidder is only able to express the quantity it desires at $90 and at $100.…”

Section: Accommodating Discrete Rounds With Intraround Biddingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Auctioning Many Divisible Goods

Ausubel¹,

Cramton²

2004

Journal of the European Economic Association

114

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We study the theory and practical implementation of auctioning many divisible goods. With multiple related goods, price discovery is important not only to reduce the winner's curse, but more importantly, to simplify the bidder's decision problem and to facilitate the revelation of preferences in the bids. Simultaneous clock auctions are especially desirable formats for auctioning many divisible goods. We examine the properties of these auctions and discuss important practical considerations in applying them. (JEL: D44)

show abstract

Section: Accommodating Discrete Rounds With Intraround Biddingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Auctioning Many Divisible Goods

Ausubel¹,

Cramton²

2004

Journal of the European Economic Association

114

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Consequently, a bidder's spectrum license valuation process is not always limited to its rational economic value 'but also the value of keeping the spectrum from a competitor' (Cramton, Kwerel, Rosston, & Skrzypacz, 2011, p. S168), creating a more competitive and sophisticated auction environment (Maasland & Onderstal, 2006). Hence, in order to conceal their strategic business plan from competitors, spectrum valuation methodologies are not always revealed by adversaries, nor are their true estimates uncovered during the bidding process.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hierarchical modeling and prediction of spectrum auction revenue by a posteriori clusters

Yun

Sarkani

Mazzuchi

2014

International Journal of Management Science and Engineering Man

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The electromagnetic spectrum is a crucial asset for wireless technology innovation and for the industry's economy. We examine spectrum auction-related databases, construct a hierarchical data matrix, and propose an optimal auction revenue model. The model incorporates statistically derived deterministic and stochastic variables to develop a spectrum valuation methodology for its primary market. Our study reveals that the underlying regulations, bidding behavior, and spectrum demands due to wireless technology advancement are effectively elucidated by the selected explanatory variables and are highly correlated with auction revenues. This paper is the first to introduce a hierarchical modeling technique that incorporates a multilevel data matrix culminated from 3995 licenses of 15 Federal Communications Commission spectrum auctions to enable economic valuation for future spectrum auctions. Furthermore, the results of this study can be applied to evaluate the significance of sunk costs, winner's curses, and associated cost synergies, which are economic implications of spectrum auctions. Our research contributions are twofold. First, the hierarchical auction model can maximize spectrum valuation methodologies, thereby assisting spectrum regulators and the wireless industry. Second, we compare the reproducibility of hierarchical and ordinary least squares modeling techniques to support adequate validation and their extensive utilization in academic disciplines.

show abstract

“…An extensive review of early and recent research literature on auction theory has been provided by Klemperer (1999), who also criticized the erroneous application of economic theory in auctions (Klemperer, 2003). Most recent reviews of the theoretical fundamentals of auctions have been published by Kalagnanam and Parkes (2005) and Maasland and Onderstal (2006). A simple and comprehensive review on auctions and implications for Marketing science has been provided by Chakravarti et al, (2002)…”

Section: Overview Of Auction Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Προηγμένες Δημοπρασίες Σε Δυναμικές Αγορές

Μαρεντάκης¹

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This thesis considers auctions as trading mechanisms in dynamic marketplaces. In the recent past, the evolution of Internet and wireless communications leveraged the wide and global expansion of auctions by abolishing time and location restrictions. These developments enabled the initiation of trade and participation for almost any type of entity like consumers, business, government etc. Moreover, the technological infrastructure facilitated and enhanced the implementation of more complex auction mechanisms introducing advanced properties like negotiation attributes, bundles of items, etc. The thesis focuses on the application of advanced forms of auctions in dynamic marketplaces where one or more of its dimensions are characterized by high variability. These dimensions can be, for example, the location of the trading item or market participants, the price, the available capacity, the number of participants, etc.An extended literature review mainly from the last decade yielded more than 450 research works dealing with auction mechanisms and corresponding auction theory, and more than 300 research works dealing with the implementation of auctions in electronic and mobile marketplaces. This number reflects the intensive research interest in the area of auctions. The extensive study of these resources demonstrated a serious gap on the systematic organization of auctions regarding the mechanism attributes, their parameters, and implementation instance. This thesis comes to bridge this gap by introducing a conceptual auction classification prototype that resulted from the intensive study of the research literature and the systematic unification of the findings. This model is conceptually defined as "Auction Classification Ecosystem -ACE" and it intends to be used in the future as the state-of-the-art model for auctions engineering.The ACE model consists of three discrete, yet strongly integrated Levels: (i) Level-1 supports the design of the basic auction mechanism, yet, it also supports the design of more complex multi-dimensional auction formats including special decision-making plug-ins, (ii) Level-2 deals with the enrichment of the core auction mechanism with additional parameters which entails enhancing characteristics related to, for example, robustness, fairness, competitiveness, etc., (iii) Level-3 aims on the efficient implementation of the auction supporting several types of decision-makers (e.g., auctioneer, technology provider, etc.) to organize the implementation of the auction and prioritize their actions depending on the implementation context. These layers can be used either independently of each other or in a sequential form. Overall, ACE is highly comprehensive and expandable and usuable, able to serve for: (i) the extensive and structured organization of auction-based dynamic marketplaces, (ii) the analysis of auction formats, (iii) the classification of literature and research findings (iv) the completeness in decision-making, (v) the expandability and integration with other research disciplines, a...

show abstract

Going, Going, Gone! A Swift Tour of Auction Theory and its Applications

Abstract: auctioning incentive contracts, efficiency, equilibrium bidding, multiple objects, optimal auctions, revenue equivalence,

Cited by 13 publications

References 92 publications

Auctioning Many Divisible Goods

Auctioning Many Divisible Goods

Hierarchical modeling and prediction of spectrum auction revenue by a posteriori clusters

Προηγμένες Δημοπρασίες Σε Δυναμικές Αγορές

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About