2012
DOI: 10.1017/s0968565012000236
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Gold sterilization and the recession of 1937–1938

Abstract: The recession of 1937–8 is often cited as illustrating the dangers of withdrawing fiscal and monetary stimulus too early in a weak recovery. Yet our understanding of this severe downturn is incomplete: existing studies find that changes in fiscal policy were small in comparison to the magnitude of the downturn and that higher reserve requirements were not binding on banks. This article focuses on a neglected change in monetary policy, the sterilization of gold inflows during 1937, and finds that it exerted a p… Show more

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Cited by 20 publications
(6 citation statements)
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“…As pointed out by Romer (1992), Irwin (2012), and Hausman (2015) it is less clear that fiscal policy, and the veterans' bonus in particular, can account for the 1937-1938 recession. The key problem is the magnitude of the bonus.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As pointed out by Romer (1992), Irwin (2012), and Hausman (2015) it is less clear that fiscal policy, and the veterans' bonus in particular, can account for the 1937-1938 recession. The key problem is the magnitude of the bonus.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…But the officials were all too in earnest. To avert the risk of inflation, the Fed took advantage of powers granted it by the 1935 Banking Act to double banks' reserve requirements, while the Treasury for its part began to sterilise gold inflows (Irwin, 2012). Inflation, sure enough, never broke out.…”
Section: Monetary Policymentioning
confidence: 99%
“…15 Other scholars who have emphasized the role of the devaluation include Eichengreen and Sachs (1986), Eichengreen (1992), Bernanke (2000), Bernanke and James (1991), Temin (1991), Mundell (2000), and Irwin (2012). It is not possible to do justice to the copious literature on the Great Depression; see, however, Bordo, Choudhri and Scwhartz (2002), Bordo and Kydland (1995), Meltzer (2003), De Long (1990), Wigmore (1987), and Calomiris and Wheelock (1998).…”
Section: Key Datesmentioning
confidence: 99%