Good Democrats, Bad Targets: Democratic Values and Clientelistic Vote Buying

Carlin, Ryan E.; Moseley, Mason W.

doi:10.1086/678307

Cited by 38 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…Relating these results to recent research on clientelistic targeting and democratic values (Carlin and Moseley 2015), these findings might indicate a vicious cycle between the targeting of less democratic voter types and the decrease in consistent left-right orientations over time.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 71%

“…At high levels of clientelism, the correspondence between support for coups and left-right placements becomes insignificant (confidence bands crossing the 0 line on the y axis). These results are even more alarming since Carlin and Moseley (2015) recently have shown that clientelistic parties are inclined to target voter types with less democratic attitudes. 8 Thus, combined with the associations found in models 5a and 5b, this might indicate a feedback loop between the targeting of less democratic voter types and the decrease in consistent left-right perceptions of these voters.…”

Section: Results and Interpretationmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…While most of the literature on clientelistic targeting concurs that clientelistic parties specifically target the poor, scholars differ in their prognosis of clientelistic targets' most likely electoral profiles; for example, party attachment, ideological position, or predisposition to turn out to vote (see Carlin and Moseley 2015;Cox 2009). The swing voter theory is based on the logic of persuasion, according to (Dixit and Londregan 1996;Lindbeck and Weibull 1987).…”

Section: The Issue Of Reverse Causationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Clientelism and the Utility of the Left-Right Dimension in Latin America

Ruth¹

2016

Lat. Am. polit. soc.

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This article analyzes the relationship between clientelism and citizens' political orientation in Latin America. Consistent political perceptions in the citizenry are central in traditional theories of political competition. This article argues that clientelism hinders the development of consistent political orientation by reducing the utility of information cues, such as left‐right labels. More specifically, clientelistic parties generate indifference among their supporters toward the left‐right divide by offering them an alternative voting rationale, and increase uncertainty in the political realm by making left‐right labels less meaningful. Both arguments are tested with multilevel regression analyses using cross‐sectional data covering 18 Latin American countries. The results indicate that clientelistic party supporters are more likely to show indifference toward the left‐right dimension and, to a lesser extent, that their left‐right orientation corresponds less with their political attitudes.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 71%

Section: Results and Interpretationmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: The Issue Of Reverse Causationmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Clientelism and the Utility of the Left-Right Dimension in Latin America

Ruth¹

2016

Lat. Am. polit. soc.

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“…Remittance recipients, however, are likely to be easily identifiable by machines, facilitating the distribution effort. As argued by Carlin and Moseley (2015), brokers "employ any and all information" to optimize the effectiveness of clientelistic campaigns. Party operatives are deeply embedded in the community, and are therefore able to find out about myriad attitudes that condition the security of investments, including turnout propensity, partisanship, beliefs in ballot secrecy, reciprocity values, and perceptions of election legitimacy (Nichter 2008;Stokes et al 2013;Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, and Nichter 2014;Lawson and Greene 2014;González-Ocantos, Kiewiet de Jonge, and Nickerson 2015).…”

Section: Are Remittance Recipients Good Targets For Vote Buying?mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The analysis also controls for income, as poverty is often regarded as the strongest predictor of vote-buying targeting (e.g., Stokes 2005;Calvo and Murillo 2004). In line with recent studies that have found a negative relationship between democratic values and the receipt of particularistic benefits during elections, we included an additional control that captures respondents' support for democracy (Carlin and Moseley 2015). This emerging scholarship has also identified centrality in local discussion networks as a factor that increases the likelihood of being targeted by a machine, hence the inclusion of a variable indicating whether the respondent engages or not in persuading others (Schaffer and Baker 2015).…”

Section: External Validity: Vote Buying and Remittances In Latin Americamentioning

confidence: 99%

Remittances and Vote Buying

González-Ocantos

Jonge

Meseguer

2022

Lat. American Res. Rev.

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How does the presence of a large group of remittance recipients in the electorate affect the way political parties in Latin America plan their vote-buying operations during electoral campaigns? Existing research claims that remittances bolster the political autonomy of recipients, allowing them to escape clientelistic networks and making them less attractive targets from the point of view of party machines. Although in the long run remittances may undermine the effectiveness of clientelistic inducements, parties still have strong incentives to distribute gifts and favors among these voters. Cross-national survey evidence and an original list experiment fielded in the aftermath of El Salvador's 2014 presidential race support the view that remittances alter key attitudes and patterns of political behavior among recipients in ways that are relevant for the electoral strategies of party machines. In particular, remittance recipients are appealing targets for clientelistic exchanges due to the uncertainty of their turnout propensity and their distributive preferences. ¿Cómo impacta la presencia de un grupo considerable en el electorado que recibe remesas en la forma en la que los partidos políticos latinoamericanos diseñan estrategias de compra de voto en períodos electorales? Los estudios sobre el tema argumentan que las remesas aumentan la autonomía política de quienes las reciben, permitiéndoles escapar de las redes clientelares y haciéndolos menos atractivos desde el punto de vista de las maquinarias partidarias. Si bien es posible que en el largo plazo las remesas socaven la efectividad de las transferencias clientelares, sostenemos que los partidos enfrentan fuertes incentivos para continuar distribuyendo regalos y favores entre estos votantes. Utilizamos encuestas de opinión pública de corte transversal y un experimento de lista llevado a cabo luego de la elección presidencial del 2014 en El Salvador para mostrar que las remesas alteran posturas y comportamientos políticos relevantes para las estrategias de distribución de los partidos políticos. Específicamente, los receptores de remesas son blancos atractivos para intercambios clientelares debido a la incertidumbre sobre su propensión a participar en elecciones y a sus preferencias distributivas.

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Shopping for Votes in Latin America: When Do Legislators Engage in Vote-Buying Practices?

Corral

Rosón

2020

Latin American Societies

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Good Democrats, Bad Targets: Democratic Values and Clientelistic Vote Buying

Cited by 38 publications

References 27 publications

Clientelism and the Utility of the Left-Right Dimension in Latin America

Clientelism and the Utility of the Left-Right Dimension in Latin America

Remittances and Vote Buying

Shopping for Votes in Latin America: When Do Legislators Engage in Vote-Buying Practices?

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