Good Girl, Bad Boy? Evidence Consistent with Collusion in Professional Tennis

Abstract

We identify professional tennis matches where one player competes for extraordinarily high payoffs while their opposition does not. Players “on the bubble” of direct qualification to upcoming Grand Slam events face substantially higher stakes than opponents, which presents an opportunity for collusion. Our findings produce evidence that is consistent with the hypothesis of unethical behavior taking place on the men's tour, as bubble players are 5.1 percentage points more likely to beat better ranked opponents than in comparable nonbubble matches. However, no such evidence emerges when analyzing women's tennis. We find additional support for the hypothesis of match‐fixing activities on the men's tour from analyzing the occurrence of tie‐breaks and the fact that our results become stronger once monetary incentives were increased after the 2013 season. Finally, the betting market does not predict this phenomenon, further confirming our suspicion of irregular activities.

A Scoping Review of the Causes and Consequences of Fraud in Sport

“…Interestingly, many factors that can act as motivators for potential future offenders of non-betting-related competition manipulation are highly similar to the ones listed above, and known to influence betting-related competition manipulation. In fact, competition advantages are also synonymous with financial rewards, such as price money, transfer promises, academic benefits, and better employment contracts for athletes (Jetter & Walker, 2017; Kihl, 2018a; Tak et al, 2020; Yilmaz et al, 2019). As to referees, they are more prone to become the likely offender of this type of fraud in sport when they are promised career advances (Boeri & Severgnini, 2013), or when they rely on the bribes they receive to complete their monthly salary (Numerato, 2016).…”

“…New research should also focus on the conditions within sport organizations that can lead to or foster the occurrence of fraud. and their incentives using quantitative methods, such as in Duggan & Levitt (2000) in the case of sumo wrestling, and Jetter & Walker (2017) for tennis, are required to broaden the scope of knowledge in this specific area. Finally, the negative consequences of fraud in sport on communities, fans, and societies in a broader sense have also lacked academic attention.…”

“…Further empirical research into the personal constituents of individuals participating in fraudulent behavior in the context of sport will allow researchers to create targeted educational outputs to help preventing such behavior in the future. As situational factors can also play an important role in individuals’ engagement in fraud in sport or refrainment from it, more empirical studies on the structure of competitions and their incentives using quantitative methods, such as in Duggan & Levitt (2000) in the case of sumo wrestling, and Jetter & Walker (2017) for tennis, are required to broaden the scope of knowledge in this specific area. Finally, the negative consequences of fraud in sport on communities, fans, and societies in a broader sense have also lacked academic attention.…”

“…Additionally, we placed non-betting-related competition manipulation in the first category, though Gardiner (2018) considered cheating and gamesmanship to be distinct activities as they are not related to financial outcomes. Yet, the academic literature indicates that this type of competition manipulation is also often linked to financial benefits such as price money and bribes (Jetter & Walker, 2017;Tak et al, 2020). Regardless of the specific benefits that are gained through the manipulation of competitions, both types (i.e., betting-and non-betting-related) involve a strong diminution of the uncertainty of outcome that is characteristic and essential to sport contests (Chappelet, 2015;Harvey, 2015).…”