‘Good Governance’ and Poverty Alleviation Programmes

Abstract

This article attempts to examine the flagship poverty alleviation scheme Swarnjayanti Gram Swarozgar Yojana (SGSY) against the background of emerging policies aimed at ‘good governance’. How far the SGSY, a major programme of the Government of India for poverty alleviation has been able to incorporate ‘good governance’ principles like participation of the people, involvement of civil society, and sound project formulation, is the main focus of this article. The governance approach indicated in the SGSY is supposed to be significantly different from earlier poverty alleviation programmes in India, especially the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRDP). However, the article, based on a review of some available studies, indicates that the SGSY is implemented in a very deterministic and top-down manner, ignoring the participatory approach that is envisaged in the design. In the whole process, right from identification of participants to supporting them, to developing a sustainable income generation enterprise, the SGSY is beset with problems like faulty selection, improper identification of viable schemes, sidelining of capacity building and, above all, lack of integration among different agencies involved in implementation of the scheme. The article concludes that ‘good governance’ for poverty alleviation programmes seems to be more of rhetoric than a reality.

Livelihood Promotion: Can the Collectives of NRLM Really Do It?

“…As regards the second challenge of generating large-scale sustainable livelihoods for the poor, the NRLM despite all its innovative trappings has come under a severe censure (Shylendra, 2010). Critics argue that the NRLM is more of a reformist intervention which is devoid of a clear understanding of what it involves to eradicate chronic poverty by ignoring structural factors like lack of ownership of assets and social barriers imposed by caste and gender which hinder upwards mobility of the poor and the women.…”

“…While women with access to microcredit may find it difficult to exercise full control over its use in view of prevailing patriarchal relations (Kabeer 2005), given its excessive focus on rigidly enforced loan recoveries and high interest rates, microcredit cannot serve as the best way to finance entrepreneurship development among the poor ridden with excessive risk. The SHGs despite some of their advantages in creating access to microcredit by overcoming market failure (Armendariz and Morduch 2009; Karlan 2007) are constrained in ensuring sustained access to larger capital (Shylendra et al, 2010). At the same time, any large-scale credit-based self-employment generation needs effective risk mitigation methods which under NRLM are unlikely to be forthcoming owing to curtailment of capital subsidy and adequate backwards and forwards linkages.…”

“…A field insight justifying the excess coverage that emerged is that the official poverty ratio fails to include diverse types of poor which may be true to an extent. It is also well established that group-based microfinance interventions tend to include within their ambit a good proportion of economically better-off households (Shylendra et al 2010). In AP, the SHGs have tried to specifically exclude households with salaried jobs or large land holdings (>5 acres) to reduce mistargeting.…”

Opportunities for the development of drowning interventions in West Bengal, India: A review of policy and government programs

“…Nevertheless, challenges are evident. Firstly, there is often inadequate mentorship from the linked banks and NGOs for navigating the financial system (50,51,59,60). This is attributable to the absence of a clear chain of authority and accountability in funding structures (51,61).…”

Opportunities for the development of drowning interventions in West Bengal, India: A review of policy and government programs

“…The Nevertheless, challenges are evident. Firstly, there is often inadequate mentorship from the linked banks and NGOs for navigating the financial system (51,52,60,61). This is attributable to the absence of a clear chain of authority and accountability in funding structures (52,62).…”