Good government and sustainable anti‐corruption strategies: A role for independent anti‐corruption agencies?

Abstract

Aid donors are increasingly seeking to link assistance to sustainable reform, including the provision of a responsible and responsive political and legal framework, the improvement of recipient countries' social, health and educational prospects, and the promotion of economic development and liberalization. Much attention is given to the first of these because of the size and cost to the state and the perceived constraints it exercises on the longer‐term changes to the economy and society; in general terms, good government is an essential precondition for good governance and economic development. Increasingly donors have focused on corruption, both as a core obstacle to the encouragement of good government, and on the steps taken to dealing with it as evidence of commitment and the will of recipient countries to their introduction. While the types of activity associated with corruption are readily identifiable, as are the means to attempt to deal with it, it is usually much more difficult to determine effective implementation, particularly with limited resources at a time when longer‐term political and economic reforms are also being promoted. It is therefore especially important that, in relation to corruption and good government, a practicable, effective and sustainable means is available to deal with corruption from preventative, investigative and reform perspectives.

Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa: Towards a more holistic approach

“…In fact, there is much more that can be, and needs to be, done. Within the national context, African countries have developed anti-corruption initiatives, such as anti-corruption agencies, inspector general systems, legal and quasi-legal trials, and public awareness campaigns (Doig, 1995;IRIS, 1996). However, the powerful have not been committed to act effectively to curb corruption (Kligaard, 1997) and most such initiatives have been ineffective and unsustainable.…”

Civic education for combating corruption: lessons from Hong Kong and the US for donor‐funded programmes in poor countries

“…Few developing countries can claim the same strengths. A number of recent studies have questioned the transferability of the model on these grounds (Doig, 1995;Moran, 2000;Theobald and Williams, 2000;Doig et al, 2005;Kamanga, 2005), and it is important to situate the civic education component within these wider arguments about transferability.…”

“…It is agreed that it has been successful in dramatically reducing levels of corruption over a number of years, even by those who question its transferability as a model to other countries (see, e.g. Doig, 1995;De Speville, 1999;Pope, 1999;Doig et al, 2005).…”

La corrupción como estrés sobre el sistema político: cuatro escenarios que explican las estrategias de defensa del statu quo

“…En forma muy breve, este modelo ve la corrupción como una consecuencia de las limitadas acciones e información disponibles para que los líderes puedan controlar el comportamiento de los funcionarios públicos, lo que resulta en abusos a la confianza pública. Ya sea que la figura de los «líderes» esté manifestada en la élite política (Doig, 1995;Khan, 2006;Man, 2009), la sociedad civil (Brunetti y Weder, 2003;Kisubi, 1999) o las organizaciones internacionales (Carr, 2006;Marong, 2002;Martin, 1999), el modelo se centra inevitablemente en las mejores estrategias disponibles para reducir la corrupción mediante la adopción y aplicación de políticas públicas y otras intervenciones sociopolíticas. Sin importar la utilidad relativa de las herramientas y estrategias desarrolladas en el marco de este modelo, empero, la persistencia de la corrupción en los países en desarrollo ha puesto en evidencia la importancia de la política por encima de las cuestiones técnicas.…”