‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’

Carlson, Erik

doi:10.1111/nous.12061

Cited by 11 publications

(15 citation statements)

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“…Carlson (, p. 215). Given that we do not want to rule out incomparability, we cannot translate this definition of universally null into a definition in terms of ‘better’ rather than ‘equally good’ or ‘at least as good’.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Carlson (, p. 217). As I point out in Gustafsson (, p. 468), one might need to accept the possibility that some value bearer ‘lacks a monadic evaluative status’ in order to make sense of my counter‐examples to the indifference‐point approach.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Along with these definitions, Carlson (, p. 216) assumes three axioms. Given his definitions and axioms, Carlson (, p. 220) derives that, for any value bearer p , exactly one of the following is true: p is intrinsically good; p is intrinsically bad; p is intrinsically neutral; and p is intrinsically indeterminate. One of the axioms says that ‘at least as good’ is transitive, which is contested.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Carlson (, p. 218) presents the argument as a possible objection to his proposal and only claims that the argument at most shows that any universally null state of affairs must be a tautology on this version of hedonism.…”

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confidence: 99%

“…Carlson (, p. 221n13) also mentions Danielsson's argument that a tautology must be intrinsically neutral. Danielsson (, p. 38) argues that,

besides being intuitively very peculiar, a moral system asserting that the tautology is intrinsically good, also has other strange features.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Still Not ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’

Gustafsson

2015

Nous

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Erik Carlson puts forward a new way of defining monadic value predicates, such as 'good', in terms of dyadic value relations, such as 'better'. Earlier definitions of this kind have the unwanted feature that they rule out some reasonable axiologies by conceptual fiat. Carlson claims that his definitions do not have this drawback. In this paper, I argue that they do.There are two main approaches to defining monadic value predicates, such as 'good', in terms of dyadic value relations, such as 'better'. One is the negation approach put forward by Albert P. Brogan. On this approach, a monadic value condition of a state of affairs is defined in terms of dyadic value relations between the state and its negation. For example, Brogan defines 'intrinsically good' as (1) p is intrinsically good = df p is intrinsically better than the negation of p. 1This approach, however, rules out some reasonable axiologies. Roderick M. Chisholm and Ernest Sosa's example is a version of hedonism where the state of affairs there being no unhappy egrets is not intrinsically good but still intrinsically better than its negation.2 (1) rules out this version of hedonism, which, being a fairly reasonable axiology, should not be ruled out by conceptual fiat.The other approach is the indifference-point approach, favoured by Chisholm and Sosa. It has two steps. First, one defines an indifference point in terms of dyadic value relations, or at least not in terms of monadic value predicates.3 Second, one defines a monadic value condition of a thing in terms of dyadic value relations between the thing and the indifference point. For example, Chisholm and Sosa define an indifference point as follows:(2) p is intrinsically indifferent = df p is not intrinsically better than the negation of p and the negation of p is not intrinsically better than p. Then, given (2), they define 'intrinsically good' as (3) p is intrinsically good = df there is a q such that q is intrinsically indifferent and p is intrinsically better than q.

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confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

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confidence: 99%

“…Carlson (, p. 221n13) also mentions Danielsson's argument that a tautology must be intrinsically neutral. Danielsson (, p. 38) argues that,

besides being intuitively very peculiar, a moral system asserting that the tautology is intrinsically good, also has other strange features.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Still Not ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’

Gustafsson

2015

Nous

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Value Theory (Axiology)

Carlson

2018

Introduction to Formal Philosophy

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Taking values seriously

Bykvist

2021

Synthese

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Recently, there has been a revival in taking empirical magnitudes seriously. Weights, heights, velocities and the like have been accepted as abstract entities in their own right rather than just equivalence classes of objects. The aim of my paper is to show that this revival should include value magnitudes. If we posit such magnitudes, important value comparisons (cross-world, cross-time, mind to world, cross-theory, cross-polarity, ratio) can be easily explained; it becomes easier to satisfy the axioms for measurement of value; goodness, badness, and neutrality can be given univocal definitions; value aggregation can be given a non-mathematical understanding which allows for Moorean organic unities. Of course, this does not come for free. One has to accept a rich ontology of abstract value magnitudes, but, to quote David Lewis, ‘The price is right; the benefits in theoretical unity and economy are well worth the entities.’

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‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’

Cited by 11 publications

References 14 publications

Still Not ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’

Still Not ‘Good’ in Terms of ‘Better’

Value Theory (Axiology)

Taking values seriously

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