Gordon Tullock’s theory of revolution and dictatorship

Abstract

We assess Gordon Tullock's work on revolutions and dictatorship using a common analytical framework that captures the dynamics of mutually reinforcing perceptions within a potentially rebelling subgroup of a population. We can reconstruct all of Tullock's central findings but we also find him failing to consider revolutions as an unintended result of individual action in certain low-cost situations. That notwithstanding, one central implication of Tullock's analysis remains intact, namely that no relation can consistently be constructed between the degree of deprivation of a population on the one hand and the probability of an enforced regime change in a public uprising, at least not within the limits of methodological individualism. Hence, whoever aims at strictly inferring macro results from micro behavior must still find Tullock's work on autocracies and revolutions pathbreaking.

Freedom, diversity and the taste for revolt

“…In some cases, instead, the threshold level, which marks the difference in the behavior of free individuals, is quite high and close to unity, indicating that free individuals are more willing to support revolt only in those societies that are entirely fragmented. These results seem to support that part of literature (Apolte, 2016), which argues that deprivation is not necessarily the primary driver of revolution but that there exist deeper roots to be investigated.…”

“…Nonetheless the latter shares many peculiarities of collective action (Apolte, 2012; Tullock, 1971). While we do not have a clear theory about the root causes of revolutions from a rational point of view (Kurrild‐Klitgaard, 2004), Apolte (2016) suggests the so ‐ called critical mass models to explain the emergence of internal conflicts through unintended collective actions on a massive scale. Consistently, some studies suggest that in environments characterized by weak incentives, bandwagon effects or participation cascades are likely to generate episodes of rebellion (Kuran, 1991; Lohmann, 1994).…”

Institutions, economic policy and state capacity

“…In contrast to this, a democratic elected government, wishes to be reelected and, thus, places more weight on the wishes of the majority of the population (Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006). The underlying mechanism behind this effect stems from the fact that the cost of overthrowing a government in a democracy is lower than the associated cost in an autocracy, as the cost of voting is lower than the cost of a revolution (Tullock 1971;Apolte 2016). Therefore, democratic governments face more constraints in their choice of policies.…”