Gossip and Ostracism Promote Cooperation in Groups

Abstract

The widespread existence of cooperation is difficult to explain because individuals face strong incentives to exploit the cooperative tendencies of others. In the research reported here, we examined how the spread of reputational information through gossip promotes cooperation in mixed-motive settings. Results showed that individuals readily communicated reputational information about others, and recipients used this information to selectively interact with cooperative individuals and ostracize those who had behaved selfishly, which enabled group members to contribute to the public good with reduced threat of exploitation. Additionally, ostracized individuals responded to exclusion by subsequently cooperating at levels comparable to those who were not ostracized. These results suggest that the spread of reputational information through gossip can mitigate egoistic behavior by facilitating partner selection, thereby helping to solve the problem of cooperation even in noniterated interactions.

Gossip spread in social network Models

“…Defined broadly as talk about social activities it accounts for about two-thirds of speaking time [4] and has been proposed to serve many functions, including cultural learning [5]; indirect aggression [6]; and social group bonding [4]. From a psychological perspective, gossip has been studied developmentally [7]; in terms of its effect on group members [8]; and as an individual differences variable [9]. However, gossip is an inherently social phenomenon [10] and thereby also depends intimately on the structure of relationships between people.…”

Boosting trust by facilitating communication: A model of trustee investments in information sharing

“…1 These network effects are well-established theoretically as well as empirically (Abraham et al, 2016;Bohnet et al, 2005;Bohnet and Huck, 2004;Bolton et al, 2004;Buskens et al, 2010;Buskens andRaub, 2002, 2013;Cook and Hardin, 2001;DiMaggio and Louch, 1998;Feinberg et al, 2014;Frey and Van de Rijt, 2016;Hillmann and Aven, 2011;Huck et al, 2010;Przepiorka, 2013;Snijders and Weesie, 2009;Sosis, 2005). In the current study, I model how these network effects can motivate a trustee to set up an institution for information sharing between trustors.…”

“…Both parties would benefit from fair exchange, but the exchange may not take place because the trustor has reason to mistrust the trustee (Akerlof, 1970;Coleman, 1990;Kollock, 1998). Fortunately, institutions that enable trustors to share information about trustees-as, for example, word-of-mouth networks or online reputation systems-allow actors to escape the dilemma (Buskens andRaub, 2002, 2013;Cook et al, 2009;Feinberg et al, 2014;Milinski, 2016;Resnick et al, 2000).…”

When Strangers Start to Gossip: Investigating the Effect of Gossip on Cooperation in a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game

“…Previous studies investigating gossip in the context of social dilemma games (e.g., Beersma and Van Kleef 2011;Feinberg et al 2012a;Feinberg et al 2014;Piazza and Bering 2008) have always focused on the dynamics between the participants of these social dilemma games. In contrast, theories such as those of Kurland and Pelled (2000), Gluckman (1963Gluckman ( , 1968 and Dunbar (1993Dunbar ( , 1996Dunbar ( , 2004 appear to predict a broader effect of gossip.…”

“…For instance, acquiring reputation information via gossip leads to similar changes in behavior towards the target, compared to when people acquired the information by personal direct observation (Sommerfeld et al 2007). More specifically, when acquiring via gossip that one is not to be trusted to cooperate with, this person is less likely to be selected as a cooperation partner in future interactions with others (Feinberg et al 2014).…”