Governance in Family Firms: A Review and						Research Agenda

Goel, Sanjay; Jussila, Iiro; Ikäheimonen, Tuuli

doi:10.4135/9781446247556.n12

Cited by 36 publications

(47 citation statements)

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“…Gomez-Mejia and Nunez-Nickel (2001) suggest that in a family contracting situation, contracts are likely to deviate from economic rationality. Family connections often have many irrational consequences.…”

Section: Literature Review and Hypotheses Developmentmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Recent family business studies call for more in-depth analyses of emerging economies to develop an understanding of the contextual factors involved (Sharma and Chua, 2013). Recent studies of corporate governance in family firms (Gersick and Neus, 2013;Goel et al, 2013) also suggest that the contextual factors of different markets should be considered, as more variations may be found. 2 In this respect, the unique characteristics of an emerging market such as China provide an ideal setting in which to gain insights into dimensions of family business that are less known in developed markets.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Chinese family firms operate in an external governance environment with weak investor protection. It is thus interesting to explore whether concentrated ownership with multiple family owners enhances corporate governance efficiency (Dyck and Zingales, 2004) or results in governance chaos (Gomez-Mejia and Nunez-Nickel, 2001).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Executive compensation in family firms: The effect of multiple family members

Cheng

Lin

Wei

2015

Journal of Corporate Finance

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Section: Literature Review and Hypotheses Developmentmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 97%

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Executive compensation in family firms: The effect of multiple family members

Cheng

Lin

Wei

2015

Journal of Corporate Finance

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“…The governance of family firms derives from their role as both economic and social entities. Family firms can therefore be viewed as both a "governance bundle" (García-Castro, Aguilera, & Ariño, 2013;Goel, Jussila, & Ikaheimonen, 2014;Ward, Brown, & Rodriguez, 2009) and a "resource bundle" (Habbershon & Williams, 1999;Habbershon, Williams, & MacMillan, 2003) whose implications may depend upon national context. We believe that it is important to consider the effects of family firm governance from both economic and sociological perspectives.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Family Matters?: A Cross‐National Analysis of the Performance Implications of Family Ownership

Dow

McGuire

2016

Corporate Governance

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Manuscript Type: EmpiricalResearch Question/Issue: This study makes use of a large multi-country sample to examine how the market performance of family firms is affected by national context. Research Findings/Insights: We find that Tobin's Q among family firms is significantly lower than that of non-family firms across 33 countries. In examining these effects, results suggest that legal context and national culture influence the performance implications of publicly traded family firms, serving to mitigate some of the generally negative impact. Theoretical/Academic Implications: We find that national context is an important contingency in determining the family's ability and willingness to exploit minority shareholder wealth. Building upon our results, future research can focus on how formal and informal institutions may be substitutes for each other. Our results help explain why prior empirical research provides conflicting results regarding the impact of family governance on firm valuation. Practitioner/Policy Implications: Our findings suggest that the performance implications of family firms are contingent on legal protections, belief in the impartiality of the legal system, and culture. Given wide variations in these measures across countries, the appropriate mechanisms to strengthen investor protection will not follow a one-size fits all approach.

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“…The boards of family firms play a central role in deciding upon strategy and differ from boards in non-family firms (Bammens et al, 2011;Gersick & Feliu, 2013;Goel, Jussila & Ikäheimonen, 2013). Accordingly, we examine the role of board composition as this, more than any other group, has ultimate control of the direction of the firm to ensure its survival as an independent entity.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Family Business Survival and the Role of Boards

Wilson

Wright²,

Scholes

2013

Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice

170

139

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We explore the vexing question of whether family firms are more likely to survive than nonfamily firms, focusing on the role of board composition. Utilizing a unique data set of over 700,000 private family and nonfamily firms in the U.K. during 2007–2010, we find that family firms are significantly less likely to fail than nonfamily firms. We identify the board characteristics associated with survival/failure in all firms and determine that it is these characteristics that are important in explaining the lower failure probability of family firms. We conclude with an agenda for further research on boards and family firm survival.

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Governance in Family Firms: A Review and Research Agenda

Cited by 36 publications

References 0 publications

Executive compensation in family firms: The effect of multiple family members

Executive compensation in family firms: The effect of multiple family members

Family Matters?: A Cross‐National Analysis of the Performance Implications of Family Ownership

Family Business Survival and the Role of Boards

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