Governance in the Australian Superannuation Industry

Benson, Karen L.; Hutchinson, Marion; Sriram, Ashwin

doi:10.1007/s10551-010-0648-1

Cited by 20 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 37 publications

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“…The commitment to ethical and sustainable business must start at the top [9,45,46], and an effective ERM program needs to originate from the top [47]. As outlined by the COSO, an organization's internal environment and governance set the tone at the top and establish the foundation for all other components of ERM [28,48].…”

Section: Risk Management Philosophymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of Enterprise Risk Management in Sustainable Decision-Making: A Cross-Cultural Comparison

Liu

2019

Sustainability

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The goal of this paper is to examine how cultural differences moderate the effectiveness of an organization’s enterprise risk management (ERM) program in sustainable decision-making. Using an experimental design, this study found that Chinese participants, characterized by a stronger prevention focus, were more proactive in mitigating environmental, social and governance (ESG)-related risks under a loss-framed risk management philosophy, whereas American participants, characterized by a stronger promotion focus, were more proactive in mitigating ESG-related risks under a gain-framed risk management philosophy. This interactive effect of matching the risk management philosophy frame to the participants’ regulatory focus was mediated by their perceived processing fluency. The implications for the literature and practice are discussed.

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Section: Risk Management Philosophymentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of Enterprise Risk Management in Sustainable Decision-Making: A Cross-Cultural Comparison

Liu

2019

Sustainability

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“…Studies have discussed agency costs and the selection of investment managers and provided descriptions of trustee boards in Australian pension funds (Bateman and Thorp, 2007;Benson et al, 2011;Bryan et al, 2009b;Coleman et al, 2006;Drew and Standford, 2003). Studies have discussed agency costs and the selection of investment managers and provided descriptions of trustee boards in Australian pension funds (Bateman and Thorp, 2007;Benson et al, 2011;Bryan et al, 2009b;Coleman et al, 2006;Drew and Standford, 2003).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does governance structure influence pension fund fees and costs? An examination of Australian not-for-profit superannuation funds

Tan

Cam

2014

Australian Journal of Management

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The importance of managed fund governance structures has become apparent in recent years. Looking at the Australian not-for-profit pension funds, we find correlations between funds' internal governance structures and their level of costs. Larger boards are linked to higher investment management fees and expenses, operating expenses and trustee and audit fees. We also find a positive relation between the proportion of independent trustees and investment management fees and expenses and operating expenses. These fund costs increase as the number of board committees and fund size increase. Finally, we observe that the presence of board committees affects different types of fund costs. Overall, these findings suggest that the conventional good governance practices do not benefit superannuation fund members in terms of cost reduction. We find no evidence of economies of scale in cost minimisation, since the relation between fund size and costs is mixed across various governance variables.

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“…Disclosure is especially important in markets filled with dispersed ownership structures, where the monitoring of agents (management) by board of directors on behalf of shareholders is essential in mitigating shirking behaviours (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The agency problem in superannuation funds is widely discussed in a number of past research papers (Drew & Standford, 2003;Coleman et al, 2006;Bateman & Thorp, 2007;Bryan et al, 2009b;Benson et al, 2011). In superannuation funds, there is a vast pool of capital providers who do not manage and monitor their interests directly; this mimics the dispersed ownership structures in the equity market.…”

Section: Proprietary Costs and Fund Typementioning

confidence: 99%

Explaining Pension Fund Product and Governance Disclosure in Australia

Tan¹,

Cam²

2013

AABFJ

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Fund disclosure is an important communication tool between trustees and fund members for product comparison and credibility verification. We examine what drives Australian not-forprofit superannuation funds to disclose their fund product information to the market. Our research derives a model that shows how the proprietary costs of disclosure and fund governance drive the disclosure of information about trustee, investment agents, fees, and overall practices. The research findings indicate that disclosure costs have a significant negative influence on voluntary disclosure, while board size has a weak positive relation with disclosure. Board independence is an unreliable and insignificant explanatory variable for voluntary disclosure. We discuss how the multi-layer agency relationship and institutional factors in the superannuation funds industry influence the power of these factors and their effects on voluntary disclosure. AbstractFund disclosure is an important communication tool between trustees and fund members for product comparison and credibility verification. We examine what drives Australian not-forprofit superannuation funds to disclose their fund product information to the market. Our research derives a model that shows how the proprietary costs of disclosure and fund governance drive the disclosure of information about trustee, investment agents, fees, and overall practices. The research findings indicate that disclosure costs have a significant negative influence on voluntary disclosure, while board size has a weak positive relation with disclosure. Board independence is an unreliable and insignificant explanatory variable for voluntary disclosure. We discuss how the multi-layer agency relationship and institutional factors in the superannuation funds industry influence the power of these factors and their effects on voluntary disclosure. Keywords: Fund disclosure; not for profit superannuation fund; superannuation; disclosure JEL Classification: D14

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Governance in the Australian Superannuation Industry

Abstract: board of trustees, superannuation governance, pension plan governance, fund performance,

Cited by 20 publications

References 37 publications

The Role of Enterprise Risk Management in Sustainable Decision-Making: A Cross-Cultural Comparison

The Role of Enterprise Risk Management in Sustainable Decision-Making: A Cross-Cultural Comparison

Does governance structure influence pension fund fees and costs? An examination of Australian not-for-profit superannuation funds

Explaining Pension Fund Product and Governance Disclosure in Australia

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