Governance of risky public goods under graduated punishment

Couto, Marta C.; Pacheco, Jorge M.; Santos, Francisco C.

doi:10.1016/j.jtbi.2020.110423

Cited by 34 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 64 publications

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“…Additionally, future work can assess if rewarding and sanctioning activities can be applied [15] , [34] , [39] , [40] , [41] , [42] to a specific target sub-population and the features of this subset of individuals to target, or how positive, and negative incentives can be optimally distributed among groups and actors. Moreover, reactions to the COVID-19 pandemic have shown a wide range of (often polarized) responses.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation dynamics under pandemic risks and heterogeneous economic interdependence

Chica

Hernández

Santos

2022

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals

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The spread of COVID-19 and ensuing containment measures have accentuated the profound interdependence among nations or regions. This has been particularly evident in tourism, one of the sectors most affected by uncoordinated mobility restrictions. The impact of this interdependence on the tendency to adopt less or more restrictive measures is hard to evaluate, more so if diversity in economic exposures to citizens’ mobility are considered. Here, we address this problem by developing an analytical and computational game-theoretical model encompassing the conflicts arising from the need to control the economic effects of global risks, such as in the COVID-19 pandemic. The model includes the individual costs derived from severe restrictions imposed by governments, including the resulting economic interdependence among all the parties involved in the game. By using tourism-based data, the model is enriched with actual heterogeneous income losses, such that every player has a different economic cost when applying restrictions. We show that economic interdependence enhances cooperation because of the decline in the expected payoffs by free-riding parties (i.e., those neglecting the application of mobility restrictions). Furthermore, we show (analytically and through numerical simulations) that these cross-exposures can transform the nature of the cooperation dilemma each region or country faces, modifying the position of the fixed points and the size of the basins of attraction that characterize this class of games. Finally, our results suggest that heterogeneity among regions may be used to leverage the impact of intervention policies by ensuring an agreement among the most relevant initial set of cooperators.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Cooperation dynamics under pandemic risks and heterogeneous economic interdependence

Chica

Hernández

Santos

2022

Chaos, Solitons & Fractals

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“…The previous effects of perception bias on cooperation dynamics imply that (1) different biases may have an impact on achieving high levels of collective success and (2) interventions are likely to have a different impact depending on whether individuals in a given population reveal a specific bias. Reasoning about bias and incentives simultaneously also suggests comparing the effect of interventions based on (possibly monetary) incentives such as rewards and punishment (Andreoni et al, 2003;Balliet et al, 2011;Couto et al, 2020;Dreber et al, 2008;Gó is et al, 2019;Vasconcelos et al, 2013) with the effect of interventions that alter the information landscape available to individuals, akin to norm-based interventions indicate a tendency for the number of cooperators to increase (decrease). False uniqueness (c < 0, left) is characterized by the existence of a stable configuration in which cooperators and defectors coexist, and the population is unable to solve the coordination dilemma.…”

Section: Perception Biases Affect the Effectiveness Of Monetary Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Here, we assume that incentives are exogenously imposed (Gó is et al, 2019) and do not introduce punishment strategies as in, e.g., Couto et al (2020), Hauert et al (2007), Quan et al (2017), Roos et al (2015), andVasconcelos et al (2013). Often, implementing incentives and institutions results in second-order freeriding dilemmas; we argue that, even if such dilemmas are solved, biases can affect the effectiveness of punishment and rewards.…”

Section: Perception Biases Affect the Effectiveness Of Monetary Incentivesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Biased perceptions explain collective action deadlocks and suggest new mechanisms to prompt cooperation

2021

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Summary When individuals face collective action problems, their expectations about others' willingness to contribute affect their motivation to cooperate. Individuals, however, often misperceive the cooperation levels in a population. In the context of climate action, people underestimate the pro-climate positions of others. Designing incentives to enable cooperation and a sustainable future must thereby consider how social perception biases affect collective action. We propose a theoretical model and investigate the effect of social perception bias in non-linear public goods games. We show that different types of bias play a distinct role in cooperation dynamics. False uniqueness (underestimating own views) and false consensus (overestimating own views) both explain why communities get locked in suboptimal states. Such dynamics also impact the effectiveness of typical monetary incentives, such as fees. Our work contributes to understanding how targeting biases, e.g., by changing the information available to individuals, can comprise a fundamental mechanism to prompt collective action.

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“…Pacheco et al find that local institutions (those restricted to participants in every group) are more efficient to promote cooperation than global institutions 23 . Following this line, the optimal combination of punishment and reward policies was analyzed in 28 , whereas the effect of different tax and fine strategies was studied by Couto et al 29 . The latter contribution finds that a graduated punishment/tax strategy enhances global cooperation rates more than having a fixed amount.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A collective risk dilemma for tourism restrictions under the COVID-19 context

Chica

Hernández

Bulchand‐Gidumal

2021

Sci Rep

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The current COVID-19 pandemic has impacted millions of people and the global economy. Tourism has been one the most affected economic sectors because of the mobility restrictions established by governments and uncoordinated actions from origin and destination regions. The coordination of restrictions and reopening policies could help control the spread of virus and enhance economies, but this is not an easy endeavor since touristic companies, citizens, and local governments have conflicting interests. We propose an evolutionary game model that reflects a collective risk dilemma behind these decisions. To this aim, we represent regions as players, organized in groups; and consider the perceived risk as a strict lock-down and null economic activity. The costs for regions when restricting their mobility are heterogeneous, given that the dependence on tourism of each region is diverse. Our analysis shows that, for both large populations and the EU NUTS2 case study, the existence of heterogeneous costs enhances global agreements. Furthermore, the decision on how to group regions to maximize the regions’ agreement of the population is a relevant issue for decision makers to consider. We find out that a layout of groups based on similar costs of cooperation boosts the regions’ agreements and avoid the risk of having a total lock-down and a negligible tourism activity. These findings can guide policy makers to facilitate agreements among regions to maximize the tourism recovery.

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Governance of risky public goods under graduated punishment

Cited by 34 publications

References 64 publications

Cooperation dynamics under pandemic risks and heterogeneous economic interdependence

Cooperation dynamics under pandemic risks and heterogeneous economic interdependence

Biased perceptions explain collective action deadlocks and suggest new mechanisms to prompt cooperation

A collective risk dilemma for tourism restrictions under the COVID-19 context

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