“…as a primary aim of the new leadership~Xinhua News Agency, 2012b!. However, prioritization of economic development has meant that environmental performance by local governments and industries has lagged~Beyer, 2006; Lieberthal, 1997;Mol and Carter, 2006;OECD, 2007;Ran, 2013;Tang, Lo, and Fryxell, 2010;Xu, 2011!. To address competing incentives for environmental and economic achievements, the 12th Five-Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development, the policy blueprint outlining key economic and social development targets between 2011 and 2015, includes the greatest number of binding energy, climate, and pollution-reduction targets while simultaneously downplaying economic goals as "aspirational," rather than binding~Seligsohn and Hsu, 2011!. Provincial and local~meaning primarily the sub-levels of municipal and county governments! cadres are then evaluated based on their ability to achieve these environmental targets, although the cadre performance evaluation system based on statistics and indicators has also revealed problems of data and information abnormalities, falsification, and collusion between local officials to hide or misrepreIn terms of providing data for the purposes of environmental performance evaluation, few studies have considered sub-national institutions in place for data collection, reporting, and verification in China.…”