Governance structures in the hotel industry

The effects of customer voice on hotel performance

“…Hotel size has been linked to the resources that a hotel has. It also represents a prominent contingency variable that distinguishes hotels (Dahlstrom et al, 2009;Huang et al, 2012). Hotel size can, for example, influence a hotel's learning opportunities, and the size of promotions (Barros and Dieke, 2008).…”

Bridging the gap: An examination of the relative alignment of hospitality research and industry priorities

“…That is, they were specifically investigating hotel related issues. For example, the performance management literature examined business strategy impact on hotel management (e.g., Chen and Dimou, 2005;Dahlstrom et al, 2008), while the technology research considered the use of the internet in the hotel sector (e.g., Wei et al (2001). The service quality literature, in contrast, investigated broader service related issues such as self service technology applications (e.g., Beatson et al, 2006) or service recovery (e.g., Sparks and McColl-Kennedy, 2001) but collected data from the hotel sector to examine their broader theoretical hypotheses.…”

Antecedents and consequences of external risk perception in franchising: evidence from the hospitality industry

“…The consideration of this control variable is justified because resource-scarcity theory predicts that, as the chain becomes larger, the mix of outlets will tend towards a bigger proportion of company-owned outlets due to a higher availability of resources and a higher focus on maximizing profitability through control of operations (Castrogiovanni et al 2006;Sánchez-Gómez et al 2008). However, size also increases the geographical distance between the franchisor and franchisee, which, according to the agency theory, encourages firms to resort to franchising (Dahlstrom et al 2009;Hsu et al 2010). Indeed, in accordance with this theory and the empirical evidence, a larger number of outlets increase the cost of supervision of units, which, in turn, increases the probability of resorting to franchising (Shane 1998;Combs and Ketchen 2003;Perales and Vázquez 2003;Hsu et al 2010).…”

“…From this perspective, the preference towards franchised outlets can be explained by the risks associated with the difficulty of controlling resources and behavior as the company expands its network (Hoover et al 2003;Dahlstrom et al 2009). The so called adverse selection and moral hazard problems in agency theory highlight the difficulty of assessing the abilities and monitoring the performance of increasingly distant outlet managers (Contractor and Kundu 1998).…”