2016
DOI: 10.1080/13698249.2016.1215639
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Governance through brokerage: informal governance in post-civil war societies

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Cited by 36 publications
(15 citation statements)
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“…Postwar commander–community ties are the peacetime social and political linkages that tether the local-level field commanders of former armed groups to communities ruled by rebels. These ties manifest in diverse war-torn countries where ex-rebel commanders emerge as sources of peacetime employment and goods provision, and as political brokers (Daly, 2016; Marten, 2012; Themnér & Utas, 2016). The nature of political settlements that end civil wars may shape how commander–community ties are sustained.…”
Section: Explaining Commander–community Ties After Civil Warmentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Postwar commander–community ties are the peacetime social and political linkages that tether the local-level field commanders of former armed groups to communities ruled by rebels. These ties manifest in diverse war-torn countries where ex-rebel commanders emerge as sources of peacetime employment and goods provision, and as political brokers (Daly, 2016; Marten, 2012; Themnér & Utas, 2016). The nature of political settlements that end civil wars may shape how commander–community ties are sustained.…”
Section: Explaining Commander–community Ties After Civil Warmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Research on civil war recurrence and peacebuilding has traditionally focused on sustaining bargains among national political elites, but recent scholarship underscores that ex-rebel field commanders are key actors in the remobilization of former combatants (Themnér, 2015; Daly, 2016) and the implementation of peace accords (Daly, 2014; Reiter, 2015). Warlords and armed strongmen are also essential to the preservation of local social order in fragile states (Blair & Kalmanovitz, 2016; Podder, 2014), and central rulers are often impelled to work through these actors to extend their authority (Driscoll, 2015; Malejacq, 2016; Marten, 2012; Themnér & Utas, 2016). Of course, commanders’ local ties are a double-edged sword.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The case described above highlights several uncertainties and pitfalls for this latter group, pitfalls which, I argue, only time and a profound contextual understanding can correct. It is common in the postwar context for ex-combatant brokers to maintain and exploit the Big Man positions of their previous war networks (Themnér and Utas 2016), which means that they are free to dictate what answers people below them will give to researchers. Furthermore, they in turn may receive enticements from the Big Men above them to exaggerate or downplay central issues.…”
Section: Professional Brokers -Pitfallsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…59 Commonly, economic inducements are dispersed via formal or informal community leaders-chiefs, ex-commanders, religious leaders, as well as heads of youth or women's organizations-who claim to represent various social groups. 60 Due to the benefits of mobilizing clients from multiple social networks, WDs are more likely to employ a rhetoric of peace if they possess substantial patrimonial endowments. In fact, by making aggressive utterances, exmilitary-turned-politicians risk alienating certain groups, such as wartime victims, business groups, and moderate voters, who may be reluctant to support aggressive politics.…”
Section: Rhetoric Of Fear: Mobilization On the Cheapmentioning
confidence: 99%