Governing cooperation hazards of outsourced municipal low contractibility transactions: An exploratory configuration approach

Johansson, Tobias; Siverbo, Sven

doi:10.1016/j.mar.2011.01.001

Cited by 48 publications

(75 citation statements)

References 76 publications

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“…Governance affects interorganisational relations, e.g. conflicts between relational and bureaucratic governance brought lower expectations of supplier behaviour (Johansson and Siverbo, 2011); and vertical and horizontal controls in municipal joint ventures diminished trust, which impaired the realisation of economies of scale (Kominis and Dudau, 2012).…”

Section: Reconstituting the Public Sectormentioning

confidence: 99%

Has Management Accounting Research been critical?

Hopper

Bui

2016

Management Accounting Research

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Section: Reconstituting the Public Sectormentioning

confidence: 99%

Has Management Accounting Research been critical?

Hopper

Bui

2016

Management Accounting Research

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“…Relational, or trust‐based, supplier selection strategies become difficult or impossible. Control methods need to be centered on bureaucratic control patterns (Johansson & Siverbo, ).…”

Section: Outsourcing In the Public Sectormentioning

confidence: 99%

The relationship between supplier control and competition in public sector outsourcing

Johansson

Siverbo

2018

Financ Acc Manag

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The aim of this article is to develop theory and contribute to empirical studies about how the effectiveness of bureaucratic controls in public sector outsourcing is contingent upon supplier competition, and why and how this interaction plays out differently for hard and soft types of outsourced services. In previous inter‐organizational management control (IOMC) research there is a contradiction between theory and empirical results concerning how bureaucratic control and supplier competition interacts in aligning suppliers. While IOMC theory suggests competition reduces the need for bureaucratic control, empirical studies clearly indicate the opposite. We extend previous research and theorizing by differing between the outsourcing of hard and soft types of services and by testing the joint effect of bureaucratic control and competition on supplier alignment. The empirical case for testing theory is outsourcing by competitive tendering in the public sector. We use transaction level data from 166 local government suppliers in Sweden. In accordance with our prediction, the effect of bureaucratic control in aligning suppliers decreases with supplier competition when hard types of services are outsourced. For soft types of services, our results indicate that bureaucratic control is not contingent upon supplier competition. Furthermore, we show that when supplier competition is low the effect of bureaucratic control on supplier alignment is stronger for hard than for soft types of services. These results constitute an important contribution to the central notion of the interplay between bureaucratic control and competition in the IOMC literature.

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“…Caker and Siverbo, 2011;Carlsson-Wall et al, 2011;Grafton et al, 2011;Johansson and Siverbo, 2011;Kurunmaki and Miller, 2011;Marques et al, 2011), our knowledge of management accounting and control in networks is mostly constructed from research in private sector networks framed by economics based theories (e.g. Van der Meer-Kooistra and Vosselman, 2000;Håkansson and Lind, 2004;Cooper and Slagmulder, 2004;Dekker, 2004).…”

Section: Conceptual Overview Governance In Networkmentioning

confidence: 99%

Governance and control in networks: a case study of the Universal Postal Union

Kilfoyle

Richardson

2015

Accounting, Auditing &Amp; Accountability Journal

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Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to adopt “whole network” perspective and analyzes the governance and control mechanisms in the Universal Postal Union (UPU), one of the oldest and largest inter-governmental networks, through the lens of institutional entrepreneurship theory. The purpose is to introduce a typology of network governance forms to the accounting literature and to analyze the governance and management control mechanisms within the UPU, a “participatory federation” (Provan, 1983) type of network that has managed the challenges of collective collaboration since 1875. Design/methodology/approach – The study benefits from unlimited access to all archival materials of the UPU such as minutes of Congress and committee meetings since 1875 as well as secondary documents and market studies related to the postal sector. The data reported in this study are derived from the archives of the UPU in Berne, Switzerland and interviews conducted with senior officials. Findings – Drawing on the work of Provan (1983) and Provan and Kenis (2008) the authors identify five “ideal type” network governance forms based on such variables as differences in the relative power of network participants and whether these networks have arisen spontaneously or due to external coercion, the authors classify the UPU as a “participatory federation.” Within the theoretical boundaries of this typology the authors identify the multi level governance structures and the use of management control mechanisms by each level of governance. The authors introduce a distinction between the “network constitutional organization” that focusses on the socialization of network members and strategy-level orchestration of the overall network and the “network administrative organization” (NAO) that mobilizes management accounting and control mechanisms to monitor, encourage and facilitate member collaboration. The authors propose that control within a participatory federation is enacted through collective entrepreneurship by governance bodies using management accounting and control mechanisms as institutional carriers. Research limitations/implications – The paper is focussed on the current state of the UPU’s network structure and processes and did not explore the dynamics around the emergence of the different network governance and control mechanisms. An exploration of the collective construction by network participants of the need for these mechanisms would provide insights into how they emerge and might lead to a better understanding of the role of NAOs in networks. Practical implications – The paper highlights the challenges faced by collaborative networks and identifies enabling characteristics of a participatory federation’s governance bodies. The empirical observations within the context of the UPU contribute to the theoretical understanding of the desirable characteristics of participatory federations that might be applicable to similar public and private collaborative networks Originality/value – This study expands the knowledge of management accounting and control systems in networks. It bridges a gap in the accounting literature by adopting a “whole network” perspective and by differentiating types of network governance structures that use management accounting and control systems. This contributes to the understanding of accounting and control across the full range of organizational forms.

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Governing cooperation hazards of outsourced municipal low contractibility transactions: An exploratory configuration approach

Cited by 48 publications

References 76 publications

Has Management Accounting Research been critical?

Has Management Accounting Research been critical?

The relationship between supplier control and competition in public sector outsourcing

Governance and control in networks: a case study of the Universal Postal Union

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