Government‐Assisted Oligopoly Coordination? A <i>Concrete</i> Case

Albæk, Svend; Møllgaard, Peter; Overgaard, Per Baltzer

doi:10.1111/1467-6451.00057

Cited by 126 publications

(89 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…A good example is illustrated in the paper by Albaek et al (1997). This concerns the concrete industry in Denmark.…”

Section: Implications For Modelling and For Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of consumers in competition and competition policy

Waterson

2003

International Journal of Industrial Organization

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This paper develops the idea that consumers' behaviour matters significantly from the viewpoint of industry performance. This is examined through some theoretical propositions, but then at greater length by means of some case study examples. These examples demonstrate how, even in potentially competitive industries, reluctance on the part of consumers to search or to switch suppliers can lead to a sub-competitive outcome. The significance of non-traditional competition policy remedies in changing the outcome is drawn out.A paper prepared for a plenary session at the EARIE meeting in Trinity College,

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“…A good example is illustrated in the paper by Albaek et al (1997). This concerns the concrete industry in Denmark.…”

Section: Implications For Modelling and For Policymentioning

confidence: 99%

The role of consumers in competition and competition policy

Waterson

2003

International Journal of Industrial Organization

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“…While extensive literature on voluntary information sharing exists, literature on mandatory information reporting is limited. In a study of the Danish ready-mixed concrete industry, Albaek, Mollgaard and Overgaard (1997) show that disclosure of data from mandatory information reporting led to collusive behavior in which prices increased and the variance in prices across firms diminished. Since there were no significant changes in costs, inputs or technology, the study predicts that firms exploited the government information sharing program to enhance collusive behavior and raise prices.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Information Pooling and Collusion: Implications for The Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act

Njoroge¹

2003

Journal of Agricultural &Amp; Food Industrial Organization

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This paper develops a conceptual model that analyzes the impact of increasing market transparency under the Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act of 1999 on the incentives for collusion in the U.S. meatpacking industry. More than likely, meatpackers will have asymmetric priors regarding the distribution of livestock prices. Moreover, they lack the incentives to voluntarily reveal their real priors. Thus, the enforcer of the Act faces a problem of asymmetric information regarding the informativeness of publicly disclosed market reports relative to that of packers' priors. Analytical results predict that divergent priors of Bayesian packers can be updated by more informative market reports, so that the resultant posteriors converge, enabling packers to identify a more efficient, unanimous trigger price. This enhances observability of deviations from collusive behavior, and increases the internal policing efficiency by a cartel that employs trigger price strategies to monitor deviations by its members. Contrary to the Act's well-intended objectives, this is consistent with promoting collusion and decreasing market efficiency.

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“…With secret contracts it is hard to detect a deviation from the cartel agreement making it hard to coordinate on a high price. With public prices, deviations are immediately detected and the cartel can sustain higher prices (Albaek et al, 1997).…”

Section: Policy Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fee-for-Service, Capitation and Health Provider Choice with Private Contracts

Boone

2014

SSRN Journal

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Contracts between health insurers and providers are private; i.e. not public. By modelling this explicitly, we find the following. Insurers with bigger provider networks, pay higher fee-for-service rates to providers. This makes it more likely that a patient is treated and hence health care costs increase with provider network size. Although providers are homogeneous, the welfare maximizing provider network can consist of two or more providers. Increasing transparency of provider prices increases welfare only if consumers can process the prices of all treatments involved in an insurance contract. If not, it tends to reduce welfare.

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Government‐Assisted Oligopoly Coordination? A Concrete Case

Cited by 126 publications

References 5 publications

The role of consumers in competition and competition policy

The role of consumers in competition and competition policy

Information Pooling and Collusion: Implications for The Livestock Mandatory Reporting Act

Fee-for-Service, Capitation and Health Provider Choice with Private Contracts

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