Government control of the media

Gehlbach, Scott; Sonin, Konstantin

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.06.004

Cited by 285 publications

(95 citation statements)

References 29 publications

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“…Why should we care about media bias? Numerous theoretical papers show how media bias can affect voting and other decisions, including Gentzkow and Shapiro (2006), Bernhardt, Krasa, and Polborn (2008), and Gehlbach and Sonin (2011). Empirically, Druckman and Parkin (2005), DellaVigna and Kaplan (2007), Gerber, Karlan, and Bergen (2009), Knight and Chiang (2011), and others find significant effects of media on voting patterns and public opinion.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Balanced Us Press

Puglisi

Snyder

2014

Journal of the European Economic Association

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We measure the relative ideological positions of newspapers, voters, interest groups, and political parties, using data on ballot propositions. We exploit the fact that newspapers, parties, and interest groups take positions on these propositions, and the fact that citizens ultimately vote on them. We find that, on average, newspapers in the United States are located almost exactly at the median voter in their states—that is, they are balanced around the median voter. Still, there is a significant amount of ideological heterogeneity across newspapers, which is smaller than the one found for interest groups. However, when we group propositions by issue area, we find a sizable amount of ideological imbalance: broadly speaking, newspapers are to the left of the state‐level median voter on many social issues, and to the right on many economic issues. To complete the picture, we use two existing methods of measuring bias and show that the news and editorial sections of newspapers have almost identical partisan positions.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Balanced Us Press

Puglisi

Snyder

2014

Journal of the European Economic Association

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“… 8 Huntington (1968) additionally provides a study on the adoption of transparency. On the adoption of transparency under autocratic rule, see also Gehlbach and Sonin (2014), Hollyer, Rosendorff, and Vreeland (2015b), Lorentzen (2014), Lorentzen, Landry, and Yasuda (2010) and Shadmehr and Bernhardt (2015). …”

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confidence: 99%

Transparency, Protest, and Autocratic Instability

2015

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The collapse of autocratic regimes is often brought about through large-scale mobilization and collective action by elements of the populace. The willingness of any given member of the public to participate in actions such as strikes and protests is contingent upon her beliefs about others’ willingness to similarly mobilize. In this article, we examine the effect of a specific form of transparency—the disclosure of economic data by the government—on citizen belief formation, and consequently on collective mobilization. We present a theoretical model in which, under autocratic rule, transparency increases the frequency of protests, and increases the extent to which protest is correlated with incumbent performance. We find empirical support for these claims. Transparency destabilizes autocracies via mass protest.

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“…Nevertheless, in our model, as in Edmond (2013) and Huang (2014), we allow "soft information," information that is not verifiable by citizens, and consider the government's strategic choice of not only whether to disclose information but also how to disclose it. This paper also contributes to a growing literature on the relationship between government manipulation of information and citizens' collective action (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita 2010; Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland 2011;Shadmehr and Bernhardt 2011;Egorov and Sonin 2012;Little 2012;Edmond 2013;Lorentzen 2013;Casper and Tyson 2014;Dimitrov 2014;Gehlbach and Sonin 2014;Little 2014a;Little 2014b;Lorentzen 2014;Shadmehr 2014a;Shadmehr 2014b;Smith and Tyson 2014;Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland 2015a;Hollyer, Rosendorff and Vreeland 2015b;Little 2015;Lorentzen 2015;Rundlett and Svolik 2015;Shadmehr and Bernhardt 2015). Different from collective-action models based on (partially) common-value global games, our model is built upon the technics in Palfrey and Rosenthal (1985), and assumes private and independent values among citizens.…”

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confidence: 84%

Information Manipulation, Policy Reform and Authoritarian Survival

Chen

2014

SSRN Journal

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Government control of the media

Cited by 285 publications

References 29 publications

The Balanced Us Press

The Balanced Us Press

Transparency, Protest, and Autocratic Instability

Information Manipulation, Policy Reform and Authoritarian Survival

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