Government Intervention, Pyramidal Structure and Investment of Local State-Owned Firms: Empirical Evidence from Chinese Capital Market

Zhong-ming, Cheng

doi:10.1109/iceee.2010.5661174

Cited by 2 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…Under China's economic system of fiscal decentralization and "double taxation", local governments have taken on "governmental objectives" such as developing the economy, expanding employment, increasing tax revenue, and maintaining stability, and they usually choose to transfer some of these "governmental objectives" to the state-owned enterprises in their jurisdictions, thus triggering excessive investment by local state-owned enterprises [6,7]. Central enterprises bear the strategic policy burden of maintaining macroeconomic stability and promoting industrial transformation and upgrading, and the strategic policy burden leads to the tendency of central enterprises to expand their investment scale.…”

Section: Theoretical Analysis and Research Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

Government Intervention, Political Promotion of SOE Executives and Corporate Over-investment

Hu¹

2022

JFCR

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This paper empirically examines the impact of political promotion of SOE executives on corporate over-investment and the moderating effect of government intervention and political promotion paths on corporate over-investment using non-financial state-owned listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen A-shares from 2014 to 2019 as the research sample. The results show that there is a difference between "internal promotion" and "external promotion" of SOE executives on corporate over-investment, and "external promotion" of SOE executives significantly increases the degree of corporate over-investment. Government intervention plays a moderating role in the effect of political promotion on over-investment. The findings of this paper not only reveal the main reasons for the differences in the incentives of political promotion of SOE executives, but also prove the adjustment mechanism of government intervention and the heterogeneity of political promotion paths; At the same time, it has certain reference value for improving the investment efficiency and incentive system of SOEs.

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Section: Theoretical Analysis and Research Hypothesismentioning

confidence: 99%

Government Intervention, Political Promotion of SOE Executives and Corporate Over-investment

Hu¹

2022

JFCR

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“…Modigliani and Miller, two American economists, developed the MM theory in capital cost, corporate finance, and investment theory, laying the theoretical groundwork for further research on financing restrictions and corporate investment. According to the theory, in a perfect capital market there is no correlation between the investment and financing activities of the company, there are no restrictions on financing, and there is no difference in the time and financial cost paid by enterprises to get internal and external financing [3]. China is in a critical period of economic transformation, and the capital market does not yet have the conditions for an effective market.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Monetary Policy and Enterprise Investment Efficiency: Perspective from Enterprise Financing Constraints

Bao¹

2022

BCPBM

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Combining theoretical analysis and empirical research, this paper constructs a theoretical framework for the threshold model on the basis of a review and classification of relevant documents, for instance the empirical study on the existence of monetary policy bank credit channels and the study on the micro transmission mechanism of China's monetary policy credit channels. Based on the actual situation in China and the current state of China's enterprise financing policies, financing constraints, and investment efficiency, this article selects the data of listed companies in China from 2015 to 2021, chooses the balanced panel data as the research object, and obtains 8745 samples from 11624 samples via the balanced panel processing. The empirical analysis of descriptive analysis and regression analysis indicates that when the national monetary policy is maintained at a permissive level, the efficiency of SME joint investment portfolios may be considerably enhanced. In the future, the main monetary policy objectives when China is implemented should be scientifically formulated according to the main characteristics of the behaviors of microeconomic subjects in different industries as much as possible, and a differential monetary policy more suitable for "targeted" development should be adopted to maximize the effect of economic policy, so as to effectively promote the rapid and healthy growth and progress of small and medium-sized enterprises and the stable, sustainable and coordinated development of regional economic development.

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Government Intervention, Pyramidal Structure and Investment of Local State-Owned Firms: Empirical Evidence from Chinese Capital Market

Cited by 2 publications

References 5 publications

Government Intervention, Political Promotion of SOE Executives and Corporate Over-investment

Government Intervention, Political Promotion of SOE Executives and Corporate Over-investment

Monetary Policy and Enterprise Investment Efficiency: Perspective from Enterprise Financing Constraints

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