Government Low‐Carbon Regulations Based on Supply Chain Members’ Behavior and Consumers’ Channel Preference in a Dual‐Channel Supply Chain

Liu, Bingquan; Chang, Xuran; Nie, Boyang; Wang, Yue; Meng, Lingqi

doi:10.1155/2021/9967381

Cited by 4 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 40 publications

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“…We then substitute equation ( 16) into equation ( 13) to fnd the equilibrium strategies of the manufacturer's emission reduction and the retailer's advertising under centralized decision-making, as in equation (7). Ten, we substitute the optimal strategy (7) into equations ( 1)-( 3) to obtain the optimal trajectory of emission reduction, carbon emission preference, and goodwill, as shown in equation (8). Finally, the total system proft is obtained by substituting equation (16)…”

Section: Complexitymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Tey calculated production and order quantities and further proposed revenue sharing and repurchase contracts. Second, from a consumer perspective, studies have investigated the efects of channel preferences [8] and low-carbon preferences [9] on the emission-reduction strategies of dual-channel supply chain members. Considering the stochastic demand for carbon emissions, Ghosh et al [10] analyzed a two-level, dual-channel supply chain model under government regulation and consumers' low-carbon preferences.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Differential Game Model for a Dual-Channel Supply Chain’s Optimal Strategy under the Reference Carbon Emission Effect

2024

Complexity

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Taking into account the impact of time factors on emission reductions and brand reputation, the reference carbon emission effect and dual-channel supply chain are incorporated into a unified analysis framework. We applied differential game theory to build models under centralized decision-making and decentralized decision-making. The aim of the research is to explore the strategies of a single manufacturer and a single retailer on product pricing, low-carbon production, and advertising. The research analyses the impact of reference carbon emission effects, cost coefficients, and interchannel substitutable coefficients on profits. In order to alleviate the double marginal effect brought about by decentralized decision-making, a cost-compensation coordination mechanism is proposed. The conclusions are as follows. First, centralized decision-making is the optimal decision-making mode, but further consultation is required to implement it voluntarily by both parties. Second, a cost-recovery contract occurs when the fixed fee that the retailer gives the manufacturer meets certain conditions. The contract can make the retailer’s advertising investment reach the level of centralized decision-making and improve the member’s profit under the decentralized decision-making. The coordination mechanism is effective. Third, the reference carbon emission effect can bring about an increase in the manufacturer’s low-carbon production input and profits. The retailer’s advertising investment is not affected by the reference carbon emission effect. Fourth, wholesale prices and online or offline retail prices are all positively correlated with the market share of the channel. The price-substitution coefficient between channels is positively correlated with both low-carbon inputs and profits.

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Section: Complexitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Differential Game Model for a Dual-Channel Supply Chain’s Optimal Strategy under the Reference Carbon Emission Effect

2024

Complexity

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“…Some scholars have conducted in-depth research on the decision-making problems of green supply chains (Du et al , 2017; Alkhayyal, 2019; Sarkar et al , 2019; Bai et al , 2021; Liu et al , 2021). Zhang et al (2020a, 2020b) discussed the optimal pricing decision of a green supply chain, considering fairness under government subsidies.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Impact of corporate social responsibility on carbon emission reduction in supply chains

Zhou

Zhu

Zhang

2023

CMS

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Purpose This paper aims to introduce corporate social responsibility into the green supply chain and analyse the impact of different decision makers’ decision-making schemes on carbon emission reduction in the supply chain. Design/methodology/approach This study uses a two-stage low-carbon supply chain composed of a manufacturer and retailer as the research object. It uses the Stackelberg game model to analyse optimal carbon emission reduction and its influence under different decision-making modes. Findings Increased consumer green preferences and trust can improve the manufacturing enterprises’ carbon emission reduction rate. The carbon emission reduction rate decreases with increased green innovation costs. When green technology innovation costs remain constant, the greater the market capacity, the higher the carbon emission reduction rate. Market capacity has the most significant impact on the optimal carbon emission reduction rate without considering social responsibility decisions and has the least impact on the optimal carbon emission reduction rate while fully considering the social responsibility decision. To achieve decarbonisation production, the market capacity must be small, and when green innovation costs are high, it is the optimal choice without considering social responsibility. To achieve a higher level of carbon emission reduction, when the market capacity is low and the research and development cost is high or when the market capacity is large, it is the optimal choice. Originality/value The results provide scientific policy decisions and management significance for governments and enterprises in low-carbon subsidies and supply chain management. The findings also provide a basis for future theoretical research and enterprise practice.

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“…Therefore, examining the effects of different government subsidies in a dual-channel green supply chain is essential to enhancing product sustainability and maximizing overall supply chain profits. In addition, according to [34], the emergence of customer channel preferences has significantly influenced the effects of different subsidy strategies. Hence, it is worthy of further study.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Manufacturer vs. Retailer: A Comparative Analysis of Different Government Subsidy Strategies in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Green Quality and Channel Preferences

Xu,

Tian,

Pang

et al. 2024

Mathematics

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As escalating environmental pollution results from economic development, the green supply chain is vital in enhancing ecological quality. In light of the rapid growth of online shopping, the dual-channel supply chain has gained significant popularity. Governments have implemented policies to achieve carbon peaks and neutrality worldwide. Considering green quality and channel preferences, this study constructs a Stackelberg model led by the manufacturer within a dual-channel supply chain to compare the effects under two government subsidy strategies. A Stackelberg game-theoretic approach is applied to analyze the model. The findings indicate the following: (1) Increases in the subsidy coefficient can increase product greenness and the overall profit in both subsidy strategies, which makes sense; (2) When direct sales channels become dominant, subsidizing the manufacturer proves superior to subsidizing the retailer in terms of promoting green quality and overall profit, which extends existing studies of government subsidy decisions. Furthermore, subsidizing the retailer may negatively affect the total supply chain profit; (3) Consistent with previous literature, intense competition between manufacturers and retailers is expected to enhance the overall profit of the supply chain; (4) Interestingly, customer preference for online channels does not influence product green quality under manufacturer subsidization strategies but exhibits a negative impact under retailer subsidization strategies. Finally, this research provides managerial implications for decision-makers and potential issues for future research.

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Government Low‐Carbon Regulations Based on Supply Chain Members’ Behavior and Consumers’ Channel Preference in a Dual‐Channel Supply Chain

Cited by 4 publications

References 40 publications

Differential Game Model for a Dual-Channel Supply Chain’s Optimal Strategy under the Reference Carbon Emission Effect

Differential Game Model for a Dual-Channel Supply Chain’s Optimal Strategy under the Reference Carbon Emission Effect

Impact of corporate social responsibility on carbon emission reduction in supply chains

Manufacturer vs. Retailer: A Comparative Analysis of Different Government Subsidy Strategies in a Dual-Channel Supply Chain Considering Green Quality and Channel Preferences

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