Government–Opposition Dynamics during the Economic Crisis in Greece

Gemenis, Konstantinos; Nezi, Roula

doi:10.1080/13572334.2014.939562

Cited by 39 publications

(9 citation statements)

References 39 publications

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“…A closer look at this case shows that majoritarian electoral rules, which provide a 50 seat bonus to the first party, played a significant role in securing Government's support in Parliament. This is consistent with analyses of this reform that showed that there was not much resistance in Parliament to support this package (Gemenis and Nezi 2015).…”

Section: Table 3 Heresupporting

confidence: 86%

The Diversity and Causality of Pension Reform Pathways: A Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis

Carrera¹,

Angelaki

2019

J. Soc. Pol.

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Pension reform is one of the top public policy priorities in advanced industrialized countries due to population ageing and the significant weight of pension spending in governments’ budgets. As a result of these concerns European countries have engaged in varying degrees of pension reforms over the last three decades. The extant literature on pension reform focuses on structural, institutional and blame avoidance theories to explain how pension reform take place. Yet, how do different conditions combine to lead to significant pension reform outcomes? To answer this question we analyze a set of 48 pension reform cases in eight European countries since the late 1980s up until 2014 by using fuzzy set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA). Our main finding is that institutional, structural or blame avoidance theories cannot account by themselves for instances of significant pension reform. Rather, we find three pathways that combine structural and institutional conditions to lead to significant pension reform.

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Section: Table 3 Heresupporting

confidence: 86%

The Diversity and Causality of Pension Reform Pathways: A Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis

Carrera¹,

Angelaki

2019

J. Soc. Pol.

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“…This changed with the signing of the MoU and the austerity measures imposed. At the beginning of the crisis, like the leaders at the EU level, who failed to agree on a European course of action, the leaders of established Greek parties failed to reach consensus on the national course of action; namely, to unify behind the MoU's programme or agree on an alternative path (Gemenis and Nezi, 2015). Unlike Portugal or Ireland (Mair, 2013), the major players of the Greek political scene, PASOK and ND, initially represented opposing sides of the MoU debate, enhancing its politicization.…”

Section: A New Division Line?mentioning

confidence: 99%

A Decade of Crisis in the European Union: Lessons from Greece*

Κατσανίδου

Lefkofridi

2020

J of Common Market Studies

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In 2004 few could imagine Greece on the brink of state bankruptcy. Greece featured in the global news as the proudly successful host of the Olympic Games, it had successfully joined the Euro and was enjoying economic growth. This euphoria would end with the global financial crisis that followed the 2008 Lehman Brothers' collapse. When the private rating agency Standard & Poor's downgraded Greek government bonds to junk status in 2010 the eurozone was ill-prepared to deal with it. Eurozone membership had given countries with high inflation records, like Greece, the opportunity to borrow at a favourable interest rate to fund their current account deficits. Eurozone members initially perceived Greece's troubles not as 'European' but as 'domestic' (Lefkofridi and Schmitter, 2015). The Greek crisis was diagnosed as being caused by domestic factors, such as low competitiveness, low revenues, high government spending and rent-seeking (Axt, 2010). Dismissing both the role played by governments and banks in countries other than Greece and the global context (Flassbeck, 2012; Krugman, 2012), discussions raged about lending to 'lazy' and 'corrupt' Greeks, who had been living 'beyond their means' (Endres, 2010; Jonker-Hoffrén, 2013). When market confidence in the bonds of other eurozone members (Irish, Italian, Portuguese and Spanish) started declining as well, these countries were quick to reassure both markets and their eurozone partners that they were not 'another Greece' (Wachman, 2010). In this context, country differences were reduced to 'cultural characteristics and habits', as reflected in stereotypes of laziness, non-productivity, corruption, wasteful spending and lying (Van Vossole, 2016). A new acronym for a group of troubled countries-Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece and Spainentered public discourse: 'PIIGS'. In the meantime, a huge market of credit default swaps had developed, in which speculators treated sovereign public debt as if it were equivalent to private corporate debt. In denial of their interdependence that necessitated solidarity, eurozone leaders opted to attribute blame to minimize electoral costs at home. By 2011, the eurozone had become deeply divided and the Eurothe second strongest currency in the worldfell hostage to the domestic politics of its member states. A potential Greek bankruptcy was dangerous for the European banks that held most of the Greek debt, which would then need to be bailed out with taxpayers' money. Given power asymmetries, however, non-indebted eurozone members had more space for * The authors would like to thank Yevhen Voronin for his invaluable help as research assistant at GESIS and the enriching feedback of the editors of the Annual Review.

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“…Antonis Samaras's NDthe centre-right 'pillar' of the party systemexhibited strong nationalist (and some populist) characteristics between the election of 2009 and its collaboration with PASOK in 2011. In that period, ND castigated PASOK's policies regarding the administration of the crisisespecially its decision to sign the so-called 'memorandum' (the written agreement between Greece and its lenders regarding the first bailout package, signed on May 2010)and tried to articulate an alternative (see Gemenis and Nezi, 2015;Vasilopoulou et al, 2013). It is crucial to stress, however, that ND's opposition to PASOK up until their collaboration was mostly based on moralistic arguments, stressing that 'the memorandum was unnecessarily humiliating' for the Greek nation (Gemenis and Nezi, 2015: 22).…”

Section: Enter Crisis: Reactivating the Populism/anti-populism Dividementioning

confidence: 99%

The populism/anti-populism frontier and its mediation in crisis-ridden Greece: from discursive divide to emerging cleavage?

Stavrakakis

Katsambekis

2018

Eur Polit Sci

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Along with other South-European countries, since 2008, Greece has experienced deep economic and social dislocation, leading to a crisis of representation and triggering populist mobilisations and anti-populist reactions. This article focuses on the antagonistic language games developed around populist representations, something that has not attracted much attention in the relevant literature. Highlighting the need to study anti-populism together with populism, focusing on their mutual constitution from a discursive perspective, it articulates a brief yet comprehensive genealogy of populist and anti-populist actors (parties and media) in Greece, exploring their discursive strategies. Moving on, it identifies the main characteristics this antagonistic divide took on within the newly contested, crisis-ridden sociopolitical field, highlighting the implications for a contemporary understanding of cleavages, with potentially broader implications.

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Government–Opposition Dynamics during the Economic Crisis in Greece

Cited by 39 publications

References 39 publications

The Diversity and Causality of Pension Reform Pathways: A Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis

The Diversity and Causality of Pension Reform Pathways: A Fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis

A Decade of Crisis in the European Union: Lessons from Greece*

The populism/anti-populism frontier and its mediation in crisis-ridden Greece: from discursive divide to emerging cleavage?

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