Government Transfers and Political Support

Abstract

We estimate the impact of a large anti-poverty program -the Uruguayan PANES -on political support for the government that implemented it. The program mainly consisted of a monthly cash transfer for a period of roughly two and half years. Using the discontinuity in program assignment based on a pre-treatment score, we find that beneficiary households are 21 to 28 percentage points more likely to favor the current government (relative to the previous government). Impacts on political support are larger among poorer households and for those near the center of the political spectrum, consistent with the probabilistic voting model in political economy. Effects persist after the cash transfer program ends. We estimate that the annual cost of increasing government political support by 1 percentage point is roughly 0.9% of annual government social expenditures.

Importancia de la rendición de cuentas y las transferencias de bienes privados en la decisión del voto: el caso del FONDEN en México (2006-2013)

“…En el mismo sentido, Zucco (2013) encuentra que los recursos entregados por el BF incrementan hasta un 45 % la probabilidad de votar a favor del gobernante. Por su parte, Manacorda et al (2011) sostienen que los beneficiarios del Plan de Atención Nacional a la Emergencia Social (PANES) en Uruguay son entre 11 y 13 puntos porcentuales más propensos a apoyar al partido en el poder, y que el efecto de las transferencias puede durar hasta un año después de que se efectuaron. Para el caso de México, Rodríguez-Chamussy (2009) concluye que entre 1997 y 2007 las transferencias del POP representaron en promedio 2,8 puntos porcentuales más de votos para el partido gobernante en el municipio.…”

Regime type, inequality, and redistributive transfers in developing countries

“…Another example is the change of targeting of cash transfers to children in Mongolia from means-tested to universal benefits on the basis of the new government's socialist values (Farrington and Slater 2006). In addition, a growing literature addresses clientelism and vote buying in social policy, where social benefits and public goods are strategically used to increase popularity among the masses and gain or reward voters (De La O 2013;Manacorda et al 2011;Nupia 2011;Zucco 2015). We contribute to this literature by arguing that political regime type may have an effect on the initiation of social transfer programmes in developing countries.…”

Winning or buying hearts and minds?: Cash transfers and political attitudes in Pakistan

“…The recent expansion of cash transfer programmes across most developing countries has led to the emergence of new research in other parts of the world, particularly in Latin America where these programmes started. Studies in Latin America have found that cash transfer programmes have led to increases in political support for incumbent governments in Brazil (Zucco 2013), Colombia (Baez et al 2012), Honduras (Linos 2013), Mexico (Diaz-Cayeros et al 2012;De La O 2013), and Uruguay (Manacorda et al 2011).…”

“…Zucco (2013) discusses the effect of Bolsa Familia in Brazil on voting outcomes and turnout across municipalities and at the individual level using data matching methods rather than an exogenous source of policy change. Closer to our paper, Manacorda et al (2011) use a research discontinuity design based on an exogenous eligibility score (similar to the poverty score used in the BISP in Pakistan) to assess the impact of the PANES programme in Uruguay on political attitudes at the household level. This paper focusses, however, on a short-lived programme (2005-07) designed to ameliorate the effects of the 2001-02 economic crisis.…”