Government Transfers and the Samaritan's Dilemma in the Family

Futagami, Ritsuko; Kamada, Kimiyoshi; Satō, Takashi

doi:10.1023/b:puch.0000013796.16886.d8

Cited by 7 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…Among others,Lindbeck and Weibull (1988); Waldman (1990, 1991) andFutagami et al (2004) have analyzed two-period lifetime models Wirl (1999). andLagerlöf (2004) assume asymmetric information Coate (1995).…”

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confidence: 99%

Samaritan versus rotten kid: Another look

Dijkstra¹

2007

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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We set up a two-stage game with sequential moves by one altruist and n selfish agents. The Samaritan's dilemma (rotten kid theorem) states that the altruist can only reach her first best when the selfish agents move after (before) the altruist. We find that in general, the altruist can reach her first best when she moves first if and only if a selfish agent's action marginally affects only his own payoff. The altruist can reach her first best when she moves last if and only if a selfish agent cannot manipulate the price of his own payoff.

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confidence: 99%

Samaritan versus rotten kid: Another look

Dijkstra¹

2007

Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization

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“…Others have also used versions of the Samaritan's dilemma to examine the effects of government policies and intrafamily linkages. For example, Futagami, Kamada, and Sato (2004) employed a similar version of the Samaritan's dilemma in an examination of government transfer policies. Lambrecht (2003) analyzed some of the dynamics of using the Samaritan's dilemma to model intergenerational relationships.…”

Section: Notesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Strategic Behavior, Debt Neutrality, and Crowding Out

Rebelein

2006

Public Finance Review

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This paper presents an overlapping generations model in which children seek to manipulate the size of the end-of-life bequest they receive from the parent. I first use numerical simulations to show this intergenerational strategic behavior does not negate the debt neutrality assertions of Ricardian equivalence.Then, by introducing capital gains and inheritance taxes, I show the crowding out effect of government debt is notably smaller in models with strategic behavior; manipulation by children increases the importance of bequests, which forces parents to save (and bequeath) a larger portion of a debtfinanced tax cut. In spite of the neutrality of debt under lump sum taxes, including intergenerational strategic behavior can significantly influence the outcome of government tax policies.

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“…The samaritan's dilemma is a situation that has largely been studied in economics and social sciences. It has been shown that it occurs a large number of situations (Boettke and Martin, 2010;Boone, 1996;Bovard, 1983;Burnside and Dollar, 2000;Coyne, 2008Coyne, , 2013Futagami, Kamada and Sato, 2004;Rajan and Subramanian, 2005;Skarbek, 2016;Stone, 2008;Wilson, Andersson, Ostrom and Shivakumar, 2005;Wagner, 2005;Williamson, 2010). It is therefore an important phenomenon.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Political Economy of Buchanan's Samaritan's Dilemma

Marciano

2022

SSRN Journal

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Government Transfers and the Samaritan's Dilemma in the Family

Cited by 7 publications

References 10 publications

Samaritan versus rotten kid: Another look

Samaritan versus rotten kid: Another look

Strategic Behavior, Debt Neutrality, and Crowding Out

The Political Economy of Buchanan's Samaritan's Dilemma

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