Governmental behavior in representative democracy: a synthesis of the theoretical literature

Maux, Benoît Le

doi:10.1007/s11127-009-9463-6

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 64 publications

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“…The standard political economy approach assumes self-interested behavior of utility-maximizing politicians, where utility is gained by being re-elected [59] and by reaching certain ideological policy goals. If re-election is the maximizing condition, a politician will promote a certain policy only if the median voter demands it and is willing to pay for it (see [60] for a formal discussion of the median voter model and [61] for an empirical discussion of how the national median voter's willingness to pay determined the outcome of the Kyoto negotiations). [62] argues that politicians are intrinsically motivated to implement instruments that are in line with their political ideology and increase their power or their personal income.…”

Section: The Politiciansmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Does Environmental Policy in Representative Democracies Tend to Be Inadequate? A Preliminary Public Choice Analysis

Kollmann

Schneider

2010

Sustainability

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There is a widespread consensus among the most important players in developed countries (voters, politicians, producers, traditional and green interest groups and bureaucracies) that a shift towards an eco-social market economy is essential for sustainable growth. Nevertheless, market-based instruments have not as yet been implemented satisfactorily in environmental policy. To identify the reasons for this insufficient implementation over the past decade, the Public Choice theory is used. The players’ behavior is analyzed in order to show that their incentives for implementing market-based instruments in environmental policy, instead of command-and-control measures, are surprisingly weak. Knowing the obstacles to implementing market-based instruments provides valuable insight into how to overcome them

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Section: The Politiciansmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why Does Environmental Policy in Representative Democracies Tend to Be Inadequate? A Preliminary Public Choice Analysis

Kollmann

Schneider

2010

Sustainability

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“…Our analysis highlights interactions between public servants and parliamentary decisions regarding the separation of powers. Le Maux (2009) offers a synthesis of the theoretical literature and analyzes the impact of bureaucratic behavior on tax rates by comparing different models of public choice. Warren (2012) studies public sector agencies and shows that the executive's agents, i.e.…”

Section: Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Voting against the separation of powers between legislature and administration

2014

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The separation of powers is endogenous to the politico-economic process, and thus to politicians' self-interest. Only little is known about what really drives politicians' behavior when shaping institutional rules with respect to the separation of powers. We econometrically compare votes of parliamentary representatives and their constituents on a popular initiative that directly aimed at weakening the separation of powers in 1922 in Switzerland. We analyze whether the strength of individual ties to the public service affect representatives' behavior, holding constituents' preferences constant. Our results indicate that while politicians tend to represent their constituents' preferences, representatives with ties to the public service have a higher probability of supporting the eligibility of public servants for the legislature. Thus, they favor reducing the separation of powers between legislature and administration.

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“…As we stated above, politicians want to be re-elected, in order to stay in power and to receive benefits. What does 30 See Maux (2009) for a formal discussion of the median-voter model and Böhringer and Vogt ( 2004) for an empirical discussion of how the national median voter's willingness to pay determined the outcome of the Kyoto negotiations. 31 See Tellier (2006) and Franzese (2002) for a review of empirical studies of partisan cycles and Maux (2009) for a formal approach to the partisan model.…”

Section: The Public Choice Perspective On Politicians' Behaviormentioning

confidence: 99%

Did the Japanese Patient Follow the Doctor's Orders? Mostly No! A Public Choice Analysis of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Schemes in Japan Before and after the Earthquake

Rudolph

Schneider

2011

SSRN Journal

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2"One of the dangers with ivory tower theorizing is that it is easy to lose sight of the actual set of problems which need to be solved, and the range of solutions. ... [T]his loss of sight has become increasingly evident in the theoretical structure underlying environmental economics, which often emphasize elegance at the expense of realism. ... [B]oth normative and positive theorizing could greatly benefit from a careful examination of the results of recent innovative approaches to environmental management" (Hahn 1998: 95). While Japan's energy efficiency is still among the highest in the world, the rate of improvement has significantly slowed down since 1990 (IEA 2009: 40ff). Japan is responsible for 4.3% of global greenhouse emissions. Total emissions in 2007 4 were 1,374 Million Tons of carbon dioxide equivalents (CO 2eq ), 9% above 1990 levels (MoE 2009a: Ch. 2).After intense and successful efforts to increase energy efficiency in the aftermath of the oil price shocks of the 1970s due to cost reasons, Japan's specific national climate policy already started in 1990 and is today based on the Kyoto Protocol Target Achievement Plan implemented in 2005 and revised in 2008 (GoJ 2008). 5 At the third Conference of the Parties (COP 3) to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Kyoto in 1997, Japan, successfully taking a mediator position between the ambitious EU and the reluctant USA positions, committed to emission reductions of 6% by 2008/2012 based on 1990 levels. In addition, at the climate summit in Copenhagen, Japan committed to a 25% reduction by 2020 and intends to reduce its emissions by 60-80% by 2050 with 1990 as base year (GoJ 2010: 38). The Kyoto Protocol target is divided into greenhouse gas emission reduction from forest sinks (3.8%), the use of project-based Kyoto mechanisms (1.6%), and domestic reductions (the residual). Altogether, comparing 2007 emissions and the Kyoto target, Japan is about 15% short of its commitment.On the policy instrument level, Japan's Kyoto Protocol Target Achievement Plan focuses on voluntary action. In 1997, Japanese industry adopted the Voluntary Action Plan, today comprising 35 industry groups and 80% auf greenhouse gas emissions from industry and utilities (Wakabayashi/Sugiyama 2007). The overall target was fixed to stabilizing greenhouse gas emissions at 1990 levels by 2010. However, besides absolute volume targets, intensity targets are allowed and the project-based Kyoto mechanisms can be used in order to compensate greenhouse gas emissions. Thus, even the 0.5% overall reduction of greenhouse gases between 1990 and 2006 are in fact not due to domestic absolute volume reduction efforts by Japanese companies. Market-based instruments, on the other hand, are only mentioned in the Kyoto Protocol Target Achievement Plan of further research. Carbon taxes, thus, have politically failed several times since 2004; however from 2011 onwards, the now ruling Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) intends to use low-level carbon taxes. Carbon markets have...

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Governmental behavior in representative democracy: a synthesis of the theoretical literature

Abstract: Public goods, Central and local government, Median voter, Bureaucracy, Partisan politicians, Lobbying, Flypaper effect, D7, H72,

Cited by 7 publications

References 64 publications

Why Does Environmental Policy in Representative Democracies Tend to Be Inadequate? A Preliminary Public Choice Analysis

Why Does Environmental Policy in Representative Democracies Tend to Be Inadequate? A Preliminary Public Choice Analysis

Voting against the separation of powers between legislature and administration

Did the Japanese Patient Follow the Doctor's Orders? Mostly No! A Public Choice Analysis of Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading Schemes in Japan Before and after the Earthquake

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