Governments’ Enforcement of Corporate BriberyLaws:

Abstract

Internationally, there is a trend toward a regulatory regime for corporate bribery with more emphasis on ex ante oversight and preventive systems, and less emphasis on investigations driven by suspected crime. Governments want the benefits associated with civil law regulationincluding corporate self-regulation and the flexibility associated with non-trial resolutions, although such tools compromise criminal justice values. In this article, we describe current legislative patterns and developments, and explain why governments need to learn from other areas of risk-based regulation, and establish a two-track regulatory regime consisting of a forward-looking administrative/civil law system with a focus on crime prevention and a backward-looking criminal law process for investigation of crime incidents. A clearer institutional distinction between intrinsically different regulatory tasks will secure a more efficient regulation of corporate bribery and other forms of corporate misconduct.

Corporate Criminals in a Market Context: Enforcement and Optimal Sanctions

“…51 Rui and Søreide (2019) explain the benefits of non-criminal vs criminal regulation for these sorts of corporate offences. 52 Auriol and Soreide (2017) explore the market effects of debarment as a sanction for corruption in an infinite-horizon repeated procurement game.…”